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The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-Aggregate Prism
Abstract
When the law conceptualizes the legal form that houses a closely held business, does it matter whether
the law envisages that form as an entity separate from, rather than an aggregate of, the several owners of
the business? At one time, this question was at the conceptual core of the law of general partnerships,
but the Revised Uniform Partnership Act supposedly put the issue to rest. Moreover, the closely held
corporation is emphatically an entity, as is the predominant form of unincorporated organization - the
limited liability company. Today, the entity-aggregate question might seem a mere relic of a discarded
paradigm.
It turns out, however, that the question has not become extinct; it has merely gone underground.
Manifestations of the entity-aggregate question persist across a range of legal regimes (e.g., bankruptcy,
federal employment law rights for owner-managers, fiduciary duties of managers, taxation, transfer
restrictions on ownership interests), and the answer to the question varies depending both on the area of
doctrine and the type of legal form involved. With regard to general partnerships, close corporations, and
LLCs alike, the deep structure on this question remains somewhat schizoid.
This essay will explore some of the modern manifestations of the entity-aggregate question in closely
held businesses and, in particular will: - introduce the entity-aggregate concept, briefly review its pedigree
in the U.S. law of closely held entities, and note the legal developments that seemed to signal the end of
the entity-aggregate dichotomy; - survey the current situation and probe beneath the surface to
demonstrate that the distinction has not ceased to exist but has rather gone underground, becoming, if
anything, more complex, confused and confusing than ever before; - offer several reasons - both abstract
and practical - why scholars and practicing attorneys should care about the dichotomy and the confusion;
and - tentatively suggest criteria for rationalizing this area of law.
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THE CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS THROUGH THE
ENTITY-AGGREGATE PRISM
Daniel S. Kleinberger*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When the law conceptualizes the legal form that houses a
closely held business, does it matter whether the law envisages that
form as an entity separate from its owners, rather than an
aggregate of the several owners?
At one time, this question was at the conceptual core of the law
of general partnerships, but the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
("RUPA") supposedly put the issue to rest. Moreover, the closely
held corporation is emphatically an entity, as is the predominant
form of unincorporated organization-the limited liability company
("LLC"). Today, the entity-aggregate question might seem a mere
relic of a discarded paradigm.
It turns out, however, that the question has not become extinct;
it has merely gone underground. Manifestations of the entityaggregate question persist across a range of legal regimes (e.g.,
bankruptcy, federal employment law rights for manager-owners,
fiduciary duties of managers, taxation, transfer restrictions on
ownership interests), and the answer to the question varies
depending both on the area of doctrine and the type of legal form
involved. With regard to general partnerships, close corporations,
and LLCs alike, the "deep structure" on this question remains
somewhat schizoid.
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; A.B. 1972, Harvard
University; J.D. 1979, Yale Law School. This draft has benefited greatly from
the insights offered by my William Mitchell colleagues during a faculty
colloquium. Their observations ranged from the mathematical ("shelf LLCs"
and the concept of the "null set") to the metaphysical (can a single member LLC
conspire with its sole owner?) to the physical (light, the subject of prisms, has
its own dichotomy - waves and particles) to the sociological (the relationship of
varnas (castes) and jatis (sub-castes) in Indian society). My understanding of
the law of LLCs has been enriched by ongoing discussion with my co-reporter,
co-author and friend, Professor Carter G. Bishop. I have benefited from his
specific comments as well as those of Professors Marcia Gelpe, Raleigh Hannah
Levine, Peter Oh, John Radsen, Niels Schaumann, and Nancy Ver Steegh. As
always, my work depends fundamentally on the love, support and insights of
Carolyn C. Sachs, Esq.
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For the modern closely held business, the entity-aggregate
question has some very important practical implications.
For
example, when non-manager owners seek to challenge conduct by
manager-owners, a strict entity concept often means that the
challengers must proceed derivatively. That is, the claimant must
seek to stand in the shoes of the entity and assert the entity's rights,
which involves not only the demand requirement but also, if the
managers are well advised, the often-insurmountable obstacle of a
2
special litigation committee.
The entity-aggregate concept also informs the question of
whether an LLC should be able to exist before it has any members
(the so-called "shelf LLC") and whether the "pick your partner"
1. Because a decision to bring suit in the name of an entity is ordinarily a
management decision, a derivative suit inevitably involves an attempted "endrun" around those who ordinarily manage the entity and have the regular
responsibility for deciding when and how the entity should protect its rights.
To guard against unwarranted end-runs, entity law and the rules of civil
procedure combine to require a would-be derivative plaintiff either to (i) make a
pre-suit demand that the entity's managers cause the entity to undertake the
lawsuit; or (ii) plead with particularity why such a demand is futile. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (requiring the complaint to "allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires
from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain
the action or for not making the effort"); UNIF. LTD. P'sHiP ACT § 1002 (2001)
(stating that "[a] partner may maintain a derivative action to enforce a right of
a limited partnership if: (1) the partner first makes a demand on the general
partners, requesting that they cause the limited partnership to bring an action
to enforce the right, and the general partners do not bring the action within a
reasonable time; or (2) a demand would be futile."); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 7.42(1)-(2) (2002) (requiring a demand and a 90-day waiting period "unless the
shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the
corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by
waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period."). For an introduction to
derivative

suits,

EXPLANATIONS §§

see

ALAN

R.

PALMITER,

CORPORATIONS:

EXAMPLES

AND

18.1-.5 (4th ed. 2003). For a more detailed treatment, see

generally DEBORAH
PRACTICE (1987).

A.

DEMOTT,

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND

2. When a shareholder initiates a derivate lawsuit, corporate law permits
the board of directors to appoint an independent "special litigation committee"
to determine whether the lawsuit is in the best interests of the corporation.
See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.44(b)(2). Depending on one's point of view,
the special litigation committee is either a constructive method of alternative
dispute resolution and important guard against "strike" suits, or a pernicious
method of insulating managers from liability for misconduct. Daniel S.
Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or "What's a Lawsuit
Between Friends in an 'IncorporatedPartnership?'",22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1203, 1230-36 (1996). At least one state LLC statute authorizes special
litigation committees for limited liability companies, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 780-716 (2002), and the current draft of the Revised Uniform Liability Company
Act does so as well. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LiAR. ACT § 905 (2005 Annual Meeting
draft), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulcullca/2005annmtgdraft.
htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
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concept of unincorporated organization law should cause courts to be
more deferential to stock transfer restrictions in close corporations.
This Article will explore some of the modern manifestations of
the entity-aggregate question in closely held businesses and, in
particular will:
-

introduce the entity-aggregate concept, briefly review its
pedigree in American law of closely held entities, and
note the legal developments that seemed to signal the
end of the entity-aggregate dichotomy;

-

survey the current situation and probe beneath the
surface to demonstrate that the distinction has not
ceased to exist but has rather "gone underground,"
becoming, if anything, more complex, confused, and
confusing than ever before;

-

offer several reasons-both abstract and practical-why
scholars and practicing attorneys should care about the
dichotomy and the confusion; and
tentatively suggest criteria for rationalizing this area of law.

-

In this Article the phrase "closely held businesses" refers to
businesses, regardless of legal form, that fit the following criteria: (i)
few owners; (ii) ownership interests not freely transferable (due to
legal or practical limitations, or both); and (iii) most (and often all)
of the owners actively engaged in managing or otherwise working in
the business. This description is based on the concept of a closely
held corporation, which has become familiar in both case law and
commentary.3
Most discussion in this Article will concern close corporations,
limited liability companies, and general partnerships (both the oldfashioned, "ordinary" general partnership and the limited liability
partnership ("LLP"), in which a corporate-like and LLC-like liability
3. For an influential definition of the term "close corporation," see
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975) ("We deem a close corporation to the typified by: (1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial
majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations
of the corporation."). For a somewhat broader definition, see Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close
Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1990) ("Certain key
attributes characterize close corporations. Close corporations have a limited
number of shareholders, and most, if not all, of the shareholders are active in
the corporation's day-to-day business. The corporation typically is an important
(and often principal) source of income for each shareholder. Payout is
frequently in the form of salary rather than dividends. The success of the
business usually depends on harmony and cooperation among the co-owners.").
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shield eliminates the vicarious personal liability that was once the
hallmark of general partner status). Especially with regard to
fiduciary duties among owners, there is already considerable crossfertilization among these forms of organization. The law of close
corporations owes much to the importation of partnership law
concepts of fiduciary duty,4 and close corporation doctrine is now
influencing the law of limited liability companies. 5 Treating these
formally separate forms together for analytic purposes therefore
makes sense. That is, this Article merely follows the example set by
the cases.
II. THE DICHOTOMY THEN
In American law of business organizations, the entity-aggregate
dichotomy dates back at least a century to the law of general
partnerships as it existed before the 1914 promulgation of the
original Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"). For example, in 1908 the
Indiana Supreme Court rejected the State's attempt to prosecute a
banking partnership for having accepted a deposit while insolvent
because the indictment failed to name the individual partners and
assert that they were insolvent. The Court explained:
It is argued on behalf of the state that the construction
suggested should be adopted on the ground that a
partnership is a legal entity. Expressions to that effect are
not infrequently found in the cases; but it appears clear to
us that in thus speaking the courts have referred to
partnerships as legal entities merely as a term of
accommodation, where there was under consideration some
question as to the rights of the partners inter se, or of the
derivative rights of creditors growing out of the equities of
the partners. Such statements cannot be accepted as
affording a sufficient foundation for the view that a
partnership is not composed of its individual members 6
For its principal authority, the court quoted and relied on a
legal encyclopedia of the period:

4. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
5. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LIAB. Co. ACT § 701, Reporters' Notes (2005
Annual Meeting draft) ("[Clourts have begun to apply close corporation
'oppression' doctrine to LLCs."), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ullcal2005annmtgdraft.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2005); Wyoming.com, LLC
v. Lieberman, 109 P.3d 883, 886 (Wyo. 2005) (Kite, J., concurring) ("We have
not had the occasion to address Mr. Lieberman's rights as a minority owner in
the LLC nor the obligations of the LLC to him as a minority interest owner.
Those rights and responsibilities in the context of other forms of business
organizations are well developed and may provide guidance in the realm of the
LLC."); Harvey Gelb, Fiduciary Duties and Dissolution in the Closely Held
Business, 3 Wyo. L. REV. 547 (2003).
6. State v. Krasher, 83 N.E. 498, 500 (Ind.1908).
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Though by a legal fiction a corporation is regarded as a
legal person or entity, separate and distinct from its
members or stockholders, yet in the case of partnerships, at
least at common law, exactly the reverse is held, and a firm,
as such, is not regarded as having any legal existence apart
from the members composing it. In accordance with this
rule, what is called the property of the firm is the property
of the individual partners, and what are called the debts of
the firm are the debts of the partners.... Notwithstanding
the nonrecognition of the firm as a distinct legal entity, it is
convenient, if not indispensable, for many purposes to
personify the firm, and it is usual, whenever the collective
rights and liabilities of the partners are the only thing that
need be considered, to use the term 'firm' or 'partnership' as
a symbol to designate the aggregate whole as distinguished
from the individual partners. And it is merely a convenient
mode of expression, which simplifies business operations
and legal reasoning. Accordingly a firm is often spoken of
as an entity, having its own property, creditors, and the
like, but this is only in the sense just explained, and means
nothing more than that the partners, as such, have certain
special rights and liabilities, which must be worked out
through their partnership relation.7
Other cases from that era reflect the same situation,' and in
7. Id. (citing 22 AM. & ENG. ENcY. LAW 75, 76 (1894)). The notion that
"the property of the firm is the property of the individual partners" could
produce chaotic results for the enterprise when an individual partner became
insolvent, and by the time of the Krasher opinion, English law had addressed
this problem by statute. The Uniform Partnership Act followed suit in 1914.
See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing charging orders); see
also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
OrganizationalLaw, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390-98 (2000) (discussing the concept of
asset partitioning).

8. See, e.g., Tumlin v. Bryan, 165 Fed. 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1908) (holding
that "a partnership may be treated as an entity, separate from its individual
members, for the purpose of its adjudication as bankrupt; but in a suit to
recover a preference, it is not only the insolvency of an intangible entity, but the
insolvency of its responsible component parts, that lies at the foundation of the
right to relief") (citations omitted); City of Louisville v. Tatum, 64 S.W. 836, 837
(Ky. Ct. App. 1901) (upholding a city's right to tax property owned by a
partnership, rejecting the partners' contention that "as two of the members of
the firm do not reside within the corporate limits of the city, the partnership
property cannot be assessed for city taxation; that, as it is personal property,
each member of the firm should pay taxes on what his interest may be therein
at the place of his domicile, and that the domicile for the purposes of taxation is
the situs of his interest in the firm property" and stating categorically "afirm,
for the purposes of taxation, is 'a distinct entity"'); People v. Knapp, 99 N.E.
841, 844 (N.Y. 1912) (holding that a loan made to a partnership was, in effect, a
loan made to each of the partners even though "[flor certain purposes this
fiction [of the partnership as an entity] may be very properly indulged [such as
in] keeping partnership accounts and in marshaling the assets of an insolvent
or liquidated firm") (quoting In re Peck, 99 N.E. 258, 259 (N.Y. 1912)). The
situation was (and is) comparable under English law. See P'smPACT, 1890, 53
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1914 the promulgation of the UPA led to the codification of the
dichotomy.9 Like all "uniform acts," the 1914 Act was a product of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws
NCCUSL's Committee on
("NCCUSL" or "the Conference").
Commercial Law worked on the Act for twelve years (1902-1914),'
and for a time the committee was apparently subject to a resolution
directing it to draft "according to what is known as the entity
theory."11 The death of the Act's first reporter (a proponent of the
"mercantile" or entity approach), and his replacement by an
"aggregate" theorist, led to a later Conference resolution "that the
committee be allowed and directed to consider the subject of
partnership at large as though no such resolution had been adopted
by the Conference."12 The committee eventually recommended, and
the Conference adopted, an Act that the committee's chair
characterized as "drawn on the aggregate or common law theory." 3
The 1914 Act nonetheless reflects both theories. 4 For example,
under the UPA, a general partnership owns its own property, 5
including its real property,' 6 and the charging order mechanism
& 54 Vict., c. 39 § 4(1) (Eng.) ("Persons who have entered into partnership with
one another are for the purposes of this Act called collectively a firm, and the
name under which their business is carried on is called the firm-name.")
(emphasis added); id. § 4(2) ("In Scotland a firm is a legal person distinct from
the partners of whom it is composed."); id. § 20(1) ("All property and rights and
interests in property originally brought into the partnership stock or acquired,
whether by purchase or otherwise, on account of the firm, or for the purposes
and in the course of the partnership business, are called in this Act partnership
property.") (emphasis added); id. § 23(1) (pertaining to the proper "[p]rocedure
against partnership property for a partner's separate judgment debt" and
providing that "[a] writ of execution shall not issue against any partnership
property except on a judgment against the firm"). Section 23 of the English
Partnership Act established what has come to be known the "charging order"
remedy, which forcefully asserts an entity-type protection for the organization
against the separate creditors of the entity's owners.
9. Wisconsin and Pennsylvania enacted the Act in 1915, and state
enactments continued through 1984. 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001).
10. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, Prefatory Note (1914).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, Prefatory Note (1997) ("Although early
drafts [of the UPAl had proceeded along the mercantile or 'entity' theory of
partnerships, later drafts were based on the common-law 'aggregate' theory.
The resulting Uniform Partnership Act . . . embodied certain aspects of each
theory .... ."); see also id. § 201 cmt. (referring to the "UPA's ambivalence on the
nature of partnerships").
15. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 8(1) (1914).
16. Id. § 8(3). At common law, partnerships were unable to own real
property in the firm's name. Attaway v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 232 F.2d 790,
793 (10th Cir. 1956) ("[Wlhile the partnership, not being a legal entity, was

incapable of holding legal title thereto, such title may rest in the partners.")

(footnote omitted); Percifull v. Platt, 36 Ark. 456 (1880) ("A partnership, as
such, can not, at law, be the grantee in a deed, or hold real estate."); see also
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protects all partnership property from creditors of the partners.1

Partners are each agents of the partnership,18 and it is the
partnership that is bound by a partner's "admission," 9 "wrongful
act,"2 ° and "breach of trust."2 '
In the same Act, however, a partnership is defined as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit."22 A partner's agency power effectively binds
because each partner is liable for all partnership
fellow partners,
23
• •
and each partner's ownership interest in the
obligations,
partnership is expressed with the aggregate-sounding term "tenancy
in partnership."24
Moreover, the relationship among UPA partners is inherently
and fundamentally personal. Absent the consent of fellow partners,
a partner simply lacks the power to convey to any outsider any role
in the partnership's management or governance; the statute reflects
and protects the "pick your partner" approach. 21 Without co-partner

Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-AggregateDispute: Conceptualism and Functionalism
inPartnershipLaw, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 409 (1989).
UNIF. P'sHuP ACT § 28 (1914). For an introduction to that mechanism,
LLCs: EXAMPLES AND
ExPLANATIONS § 8.8.4, at 234-35 (2d ed. 2002). For a more detailed discussion,
see Daniel S. Kleinberger et al., Charging Orders and the New Uniform Limited
17.

see DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND

PartnershipAct: Dispelling Rumors of Disaster, PROB. & PROP., July/August
2004, at 30-34.
18. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 9(1).

19. Id. § 11.
20. Id. § 13.
21. Id. § 14.
22. Id. § 6(1) (emphasis added).
23. Id. § 15.
24. Id. § 25(1).
25. See, e.g., Sunshine Cellular v. Vanguard Cellular Sys., Inc., No. 92 Civ.
3194 (RLC), 1993 WL 212675, at *4 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993) (referring to
"fundamental right of partnership law, the right to choose one's partners");
Kellis v. Ring, 155 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. App. 3d 1979) ("Personality is the
very essence of a general partnership and although not as inherently pervasive
in a limited partner, it is clear that... the nature of this legal entity does place
a premium on personality."); S. Stacy Eastland, The Art of Making Uncle Sam
Your Assignee Instead of Your Senior Partner:The Use of Partnershipsin Estate
Planning, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE
ESTATES, 945, 954 (2004) ("One of the reasons why partnership law is so

different from corporate law with respect to transferability [of ownership
interests] is that, under state law, it is assumed that the essence of
partnerships is a personal relationship. Since it is a personal relationship, you

should have the freedom to be able to choose your partners. No one can force
you to be a partner with someone with whom you do not wish to be a partner.
This lack of free transferability.., is the essence of partnership law . . . ."). For

a further discussion of this concept, see Carter G. Bishop, The Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act: Summary & Analysis, 51 Bus. LAw. 51, 63 (1995), and
Carter G. Bishop, Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations:
Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships,29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 1039
(1995).
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consent, all that can be transferred are a partner's economic rights.26
Moreover, there is a nexus between an owner's dissociation from the
enterprise and the enterprise's susceptibility to dissolution. The
departure of any partner from the partnership, for any reason,
dissolves the organization; an aggregate minus any member is a
different aggregate.27
On balance, the UPA probably tilts more toward aggregate than
toward entity. At least that is the view of authorities as dissimilar
as the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the United States
Treasury. The Restatement (Second) of Agency, adopted in 1957,
conceptualizes the general partnership as comprising relationships
of mutual agency: "a partner is a general agent for the other
members of the group" and "the members of the partnership are
liable as principals both in contract and in tort for the acts of a
partner which are authorized and those which bind them because
the act is within the agency power of the partner."28
The United States Treasury's "Kintner Regulations," adopted in
1960, enshrined the aggregate aspects of partnership law as part of
the regulatory method for determining whether unincorporated
business organizations were to be taxed as partnerships or
corporations.

29

Prior to January 1, 1997, these regulations determined how to
classify unincorporated business organizations and were biased
26. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 27(1) (1914). Before the 1997 promulgation of the
IRS "check-the-box" tax classification regulations, this aspect of partnership law
helped determine whether an unincorporated business organization would be
taxed as a partnership or as a corporation. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S.
KLEINBERGER,

LIMITED

LIABIITY

COMPANIES:

TAX

AND

BusINEss

LAW

8.06[1] [a], n.434 (1995 & Supp. 2004-2).
27. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT §§ 29, 31 (1914). The UPA is not completely pure on
this point. The admission of a new partner likewise changes "the mix" but does
not likewise create a new partnership. Section 17 merely (and obliquely)
provides that the newly admitted partner is not personally liable for those
partnership debts "incurred" prior to the admission. The section rejects the
"theory of the common law ... that a new partnership is formed" when a new
partner joins. Id. § 17 cmt.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 A cmt. a (emphasis added)
(1957).
29. United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 168 (10th Cir. 1969). The
Pennsylvania Attorney General opined on the IRS's Kintner Regulations:
Regulations recently adopted by the Internal Revenue Service have
greatly simplified this resemblance rule by reducing it to a more
quantitative test. These regulations provide that an unincorporated
organization may be classified as an association if such organization
has a majority of those characteristics which are normally possessed
by a pure corporation but not by a partnership.
Medical Partnership Associations, Op. Pa. Att'y Gen., 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 29
(1961) (footnote omitted). The Kintner Regulations derived from a 1935 United
States Supreme Court decision. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935). For an analysis of Morrissey, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
[ 2.02[2] [a] [i].
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toward finding partnership status. The regulations identified four
key corporate characteristics (i.e., limited liability, continuity of life,
free transferability of ownership interests, and centralized
management), and classified an unincorporated organization as a
corporation only if the organization had three or more of the
corporate characteristics. 0
The opposite of each corporate characteristic was a partnership
characteristic: no complete liability shield; the dissociationdissolution nexus (i.e., no continuity of life); lack of free
transferability (i.e., "pick your partner"); and decentralized
management. Two of these four-no continuity of life and "pick your
partner"--reflect the aggregate paradigm.
III. THAT WAS THEN; THIS IS NoW-AND WE'RE ALL ENTITIES NOw 3 '

The RUPA General Partnership
The drafters of RUPA sought to shift the law of general
partnerships away from the aggregate paradigm.32 RUPA § 201(a)
states categorically: "A partnership is an entity distinct from its
partners."33 In addition, for RUPA general partnerships that become
LLPs, a corporate-like liability shield eliminates the power of a
partner to bind a fellow partner as a principal.3 4 As for the notion
that an aggregate that loses a member is not the same aggregate,
RUPA has so attenuated the dissociation-dissolution nexus that the
Act includes a statutory buy-out mechanism, applicable "[i]f a

A.

30. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 1.01[3] [a] (footnote omitted).
31. The first part of the caption is taken from the title of the 1985 movie,
directed by Christopher Cain, THAT WAS THEN ... THIS is Now (Paramount
Home Entertainment 1985). The second part of the caption is derived from a
famous observation, made by the conservative economist, Milton Friedman,
that "we are all Keynesians now." Milton Friedman, We Are All Keynesians
Now, TIME (Dec. 31, 1965).
32. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201 cmt. (1997) ("RUPA embraces the entity

theory of the partnership."); Robert W. Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners:
Cutting the Gordian Knot with Continuing Partnership Entities, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7,

7 (1995) ("The most sweeping change brought about by

[RUPA] is the treatment of partnerships as entities rather than aggregates of
their members."); Rosin, supra note 16, at 400 (stating that "over seventy years
after the adoption of the UPA, many commentators argue that the UPA is
ambiguous or that it reflects a compromise between the aggregate and the
entity concepts," and dissenting from that viewpoint).
33. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a) (1997).
34. Under RUPA, an LLP is simply a general partnership with a corporatelike liability shield. See id. § 306(c) ("An obligation of a partnership incurred
while the partnership is a limited liability partnership, whether arising in
contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the partnership. A partner
is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or
otherwise, for such an obligation solely by reason of being or so acting as a
partner."). Not all states provide for "full-shield" LLPs. For an introduction to
LLPs, see KLEINBERGER, supra note 17, §§ 14.1, 14.2.
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partner is dissociated from a partnership without resulting in a
dissolution."35 The aggregate-sounding "tenancy in partnership" has

been replaced with a straightforward description of a partner's
management and economic rights." It seems, therefore, that the
American law of general partnerships has left behind the entityaggregate dichotomy, at least where RUPA applies.
B. The Close Corporationas an Entity, and the Limited Liability
Company Too
It also seems that the dichotomy has no place in the law
governing close corporations and limited liability companies, the
other two organizations that predominate as structures for housing
closely held businesses. Close or otherwise, the corporation is the
paradigmatic entity separate from its owners,3Mand in this respect
35. REVISED UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 701(a) (1997); see also id., Prefatory Note
("Under the Revised Act, the withdrawal of a partner is a 'dissociation' that
results in a dissolution of the partnership only in certain limited circumstances.
Many dissociations result merely in a buyout of the withdrawing partner's
interest rather than a winding up of the partnership's business. RUPA defines
both the substance and procedure of the buyout right."). RUPA's attenuation of
the dissociation-dissolution nexus caused additional statutory ripples. Under
the UPA's aggregate approach, that nexus provided the conceptual mechanism
for constraining a dissociated partner's lingering power to bind the enterprise
and for limiting each partner's lingering liability for the obligations of the
enterprise. UNIF P'SHIP ACT §§ 33, 35 (1914). Consonant with its shift to the
entity construct, RUPA re-states these mechanisms as pertaining principally to
the dissociation of a partner. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 702-03. Thus, RUPA
conceptualized these important mechanics as pertaining principally to the
person exiting the enterprise and not necessarily as reflecting a change to the
enterprise itself. ULPA further refines and elaborates that approach. UNIF.
LTD. P'SHIP ACT §§ 606-07, 804-05 (2001).
36. RUPA §§ 401, 403, 502.
37. As of May 17, 2005, RUPA has been adopted in thirty-three states and
the District of Columbia. It was introduced in four more states during the 2005
legislative session. See
LEGISLATIVE

FACT

NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
at
ACT,
PARTNERSHIP
UNIFORM
FOR
THE
SHEET

http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fsupa9497.asp
(last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
38. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.03(a) (2002) ("Unless a delayed effective date
is specified, the corporate existence begins when the articles of incorporation
are filed."); id. § 2.05 (describing procedures for organizing and operating the
corporation before it has any owners); see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

100

(8th ed. 2000) ("A

corporation is a 'legal person' or 'legal entity."'); D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A.
WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND CASE STUDIES

174

(2004) ("Unlike general partnerships under the UPA, corporations are without
question legal entities with identities separate from the owners (shareholders)
of the corporation."); LEwIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 3.1, at 36 (3d ed. 1999) ("Corporate existence
and the attributes of 'corporateness' begin with the filing of articles of
incorporation or, in some states, when a state official issues a certificate of
incorporation."). Close corporation status does not alter this fundamental
characteristic. See, e.g., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPPLEMENT, § 21(b)
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the limited liability company seems corporate. It is "a legal entity
distinct from its members,"39 even though it is ordinarily taxed as a
partnership4 ° and typically has a governance structure that
resembles either a general or limited partnership.4 1
The corporation's legal persona has long been established. For
example, in 1908 the United States Supreme Court stated:
Philosophy may have gained by the attempts in recent
years to look through the fiction to the fact and to
generalize corporations, partnerships, and other groups into
a single conception. But to generalize is to omit, and, in this
instance, to omit one characteristic of the complete
corporation, as called into being under modem statutes,
that is most important in business and law. A leading
purpose of such statutes and of those who act under them is
to interpose a nonconductor, through which, in matters of
42
contract, it is impossible to see the men behind.
(2002) (contemplating amendment to a close corporation's articles of
incorporation before the corporation has any shareholders or even subscribers
for shares).
39. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 201 (1996). See also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 18-201(b) ("A limited liability company formed under this chapter shall be
a separate legal entity, the existence of which as a separate legal entity shall
continue until cancellation of the limited liability company's certificate of
formation."); accord N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 203(d) (McKinney 2001)
(referring to "the cancellation of the limited liability company's articles of
organization"); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003)
("'Limited liability company' or 'domestic limited liability company' means an
entity that is an unincorporated association that is organized and existing
under this chapter. A limited liability company's status for federal tax purposes
shall not affect its status as a distinct entity organized and existing under this
chapter.").
40. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, T 2.01.
41. Id. §§ 7.01-.04; KLEINBERGER, supra note 17, § 13.4 at 438.
42. Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U.S. 267, 273 (1908).
Approximately one century earlier, the Supreme Court had issued an opinion
conceptualizing the corporation as an aggregate, at least in the context of
diversity jurisdiction. However, the Court changed its mind a mere thirty-five
years later:
The Supreme Court's first opinion on diversity jurisdiction for
entities stated that "the term 'citizen' ought to be understood as it is
used in the Constitution,... [t]hat is, to describe the real persons who
come into court." Accordingly, "[t]hat invisible, intangible, and
artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is
certainly not a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the
courts of the United States, unless the rights of the members, in this
respect, can be exercised in their corporate name." Therefore, the
corporate plaintiff had the citizenship of each of the human beings
that "composed" it. (internal citations omitted)
In 1844, the Supreme Court reversed itself and declared a
corporation to be a citizen of its state of incorporation, at least where
the corporation did business in its state of incorporation. "[A]
corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to
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And in 1930, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: "[It] leads nowhere to
call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction, it is a fiction created by
law with intent that it should be acted on as if true. The corporation
",43
is a person ....
The limited liability company, in contrast, is a far newer entity
and that newness, combined with the LLC's partnership law
origins, 4 has produced myriad decisions reiterating the LLC's entity
status and detailing the consequences of that status. 45 For example:
-

members, as members, are not liable for the obligations
of the LLC; 46 the juridical separateness between the LLC
and its members "prevents an LLC from binding its
4
members or subjecting them to liability" or obligations;

be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, although an
artificial person, an inhabitant of the same state, for the purposes of

its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as
much as a natural person."
Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 558 (1844). Carter G.
Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Diversity Jurisdictionfor LLCs? Basically,
ForgetAbout It, Bus. LAW TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2004, at 31, 34.
43. Klein v. Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930); see also Brock v.
Poor, 111 N.E. 229, 234 (N.Y 1915) ("[Tlhe force and comprehensiveness of the
rule that corporate existence is not lost through mere corporate inaction or
transfer of property; that the corporation in respect of corporate property and
rights is entirely distinct from the stockholders who are the ultimate or
equitable owners of its assets; that even complete ownership of capital stock
does not operate to transfer the title to corporate property; and that ownership
of capital stock is by no means identical with or equivalent to ownership of
corporate property"); H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,repr.
in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 21-48, at 36 (Clarendon Press

1983) ("It has been said by many that the juristic controversy over the nature of
corporate personality is dead."). Corporate "personhood" obtained effective
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment before female personhood did.
Compare Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 188-89 (1888) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "was designed to
prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special
subject for discriminating and hostile legislation" and that "[ulnder the
designation of 'person' there is no doubt that a private corporation is included")
with Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 170, 178 (1874) (concluding
that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause does apply to women, but
upholding a provision in the Missouri State Constitution that allowed only male
citizens to vote).
44. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,supranote 26, 5.04[2] [c].
45. For a detailed discussion of this point and compilation and analysis of
cases, see id. § 5.05[1] [e].
46. E.g., UNIF. LTD.LIAB. Co. ACT § 303(a) (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-330(a) (2000). See generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 27, 6.
47. Indus. Elecs. Corp. of Wis. v. iPower Distrib. Group, Inc., 215 F.3d 677,
679 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing WIS. STAT. § 183.0304 (2002)). See also, e.g., Page
v. Roscoe, LLC, 128 N.C. App. 678, 687, 497 S.E.2d 422, 428 (1998) (imposing
Rule 11 sanctions for naming an LLC member as a defendant for claims
pertaining only to the LLC).
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-

members have no standing to enforce
the LLC's rights,
8
except through derivative litigation;

-

an LLC has no standing to enforce a contract
made by
49
its members in their individual capacities;

-

it can be reversible error to tell a jury who the members
of an LLC are when the LLC is the party in interest;
and 5°

-

contribution of property by a member to the LLC
transfers ownership of that property from one juridical
51

839

person (the member) to another owner (the LLC).

The effect on property rights is dramatically and ironically
illustrated by Gebhardt Family Investment, LLC v. Nations Title
Insurance of New York, Inc.52 For estate planning purposes, a
husband and wife (the Gebhardts) conveyed real estate to an LLC.
There was a cloud on the title to some of the real property, and the
Gebhardts had previously reported the problem to their title
insurer.
After the conveyance, the title insurance company asserted that
the title insurance no longer applied because the LLC had succeeded
to the title by "purchase" rather than operation of law and so was
not insured under the policy.53 The Gebhardts contended that, in

economic reality, no purchase had occurred and that they still
effectively owned the land.54 Although the deed of conveyance
48. Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1092 (E.D.
Tex. 2000) (holding that, in a dispute between franchisees and their franchisor,
members of an LLC lacked standing to sue for damages allegedly suffered by
the LLC as a franchisee).
49. E.g., Dawson v. Atlanta Design Assocs., Inc., 144 N.C. App. 716, 719-20,
551 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2001) (reversing a trial court order which required the
LLC to be substituted as plaintiff, noting that the two active members of the
LLC had contracted with a design firm in their individual capacities).
50. Housing 21, LLC v. Atlantic Home Builders Co., 289 F.3d 1050, 1054-55
(8th Cir. 2002).
51. E.g., Hagan v. Adams Prop. Assocs., Inc., 482 S.E.2d 805, 807 (Va.
1997) (holding that such a contribution made the contributing members liable
to a real estate broker to whom they had promised a commission on any sale or
exchange of the property).
52. 752 A.2d 1222 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000). This and the following three
paragraphs are taken, with permission of the authors, essentially verbatim
from BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 5.05 [1] [e].
53. Gebhardt, 752 A.2d at 1124.
54. Id. (describing counsel as stating, "we've clearly shown there's no
purchase here, that the [husband and wife] are still the owners and maintain
the ownership interest which the policy says, in the land, and therefore they're
covered under this policy as well as the LLC, they're both covered under this
policy").
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recited consideration of $160,990, the husband's unrebutted
testimony was "that not a penny of consideration was paid for the
conveyance, and that consideration of $160,990.00 was recited on
the deed so that the State could assess the transfer taxes from the
individual to the LLC. 55
Both the trial and appellate court disagreed. "[I]t is the LLC
that has the interest in the property. To hold otherwise would be to
disregard the nature and viability of limited liability companies,"
because a limited liability company is a separate legal person,
distinct from its members. When the Gebhardts conveyed the real
estate to their limited liability company,
"they effected a transfer
56
from one entity or person to another.
As to the "suggestion that there was no real conveyance from
the Gebhardts to the LLC because the LLC paid no consideration for
the property," the court stated that the argument "is utterly without
merit. .

.

. [I]n exchange for the property the LLC provided the

Gebhardts with all of the benefits conferred by a Virginia limited
liability company, including limited liability and certain estate
planning benefits."57 In sum, a transfer had occurred; the new
owner--even though wholly controlled by the old owners-was a
separate and distinct legal person and therefore not an insured
under the contract of title insurance.
What makes this case ironic (as well as unfortunate for the
Gebhardts) is the role another title insurance case played in shaping
RUPA.
That case, decided under the aggregate theory of
partnerships, informed the decision to make RUPA an entity statute.
As explained in one of RUPA's official comments:
Under RUPA, there is no "new" partnership just because of
membership changes. That will avoid the result in cases
such as FairwayDevelopment Co. v. Title Insurance Co., 621
F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985), which held that the "new"
partnership resulting from a partner's death did not have
standing to enforce a title insurance policy issued to the

55. Id.
56. Id. at 1226 (quoting Hagan v. Adams Prop. Assocs., Inc., 482 S.E.2d
805, 807 (Va. 1997)).
57. Id. Strictly speaking, the court misunderstood the consideration
involved. The benefits mentioned by the court follow from the transaction, but
do not constitute the consideration transferred from the LLC to the Gebhardts
in exchange for the real estate. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
71(2) (1979) (defining "consideration" in terms of an exchange of values).
Instead, that consideration consisted of the membership interests obtained by
the Gebhardts from the limited liability company. The court also rejected the
Gebhardts' claim that, as transferors of the disputed parcel, they had suffered a
loss under the policy. The Gebhardts provided no evidence that the cloud on the
title had actually affected the value of the consideration they received from the
LLC. Gebhardt,752 A.2d at 1227.
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"old" partnership.58
Irony aside, it does appear that the predominant forms of closely
held businesses-general partnerships, close corporations, and
LLCs-are indeed all entities now.
IV.

THE DICHOTOMY BENEATH THE SURFACE (NOTES FROM THE
UNDERGROUND) 59

Aggregate Characteristicsof the RUPA General Partnership
A bit beneath the surface, however, the picture is not so clear.
RUPA remains a "pick your partner" statute,60 and there is nothing
more aggregate-like than the principle that any new partner must
be approved by each existing partner. Even the charging order
mechanism, originated to protect the partnership "entity" from the

A.

claims of partner creditors, 6' has

as a

parallel purpose-the

2
protection of the "pick your partner" principle.

58. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201 cmt. (1997).
59. Part of this caption is borrowed from the title of a work by Feodor
Dostoevsky. FEODOR M. DOSTOEVSKY, Notes from the Underground in WHITE
NIGHTS, AND OTHER STORIES (Constance Garnett, trans., 1918), available at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/DosNote.html (last visited Aug.
26, 2005).
60. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401(i) (1997) (providing that admission of a
new member requires unanimous consent of the partners); id. § 503(a)(3)
(providing that, unless admitted as a partner, a partner's transferee has no
management rights and no information rights).
61. For further explanation of the mechanics and functions of a charging
order, see Kleinberger et al., supranote 17, at 30-34.
62. NCCUSL's most recent explanation of the role of the charging order
appears in an official UPLA comment:
This section balances the needs of a judgment creditor of a
partner or transferee with the needs of the limited partnership and
The section achieves that
non-debtor partners and transferees.
balance by allowing the judgment creditor to collect on the judgment
through the transferable interest of the judgment debtor while
prohibiting interference in the management and activities of the
limited partnership.
Under this section, the judgment creditor of a partner or
transferee is entitled to a charging order against the relevant
transferable interest. While in effect, that order entitles the judgment
creditor to whatever distributions would otherwise be due to the
partner or transferee whose interest is subject to the order. The
creditor has no say in the timing or amount of those distributions.
The charging order does not entitle the creditor to accelerate any
distributions or to otherwise interfere with the management and
activities of the limited partnership.
Foreclosure of a charging order effects a permanent transfer of
the charged transferable interest to the purchaser. The foreclosure
does not, however, create any rights to participate in the management
and conduct of the limited partnership's activities. The purchaser
obtains nothing more than the status of a transferee.
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In addition, RUPA purposefully eschews one of the most logical
consequences of entity status-namely, a distinction (with
consequences) between direct and derivative claims.63 "RUPA does
not authorize derivative actions," and each partner has standing to
bring claims directly for injuries suffered by the partnership.65
And of the Limited Liability Company
LLC law generally maintains the direct-derivative distinction,66
but LLCs definitely follow the "pick your partner" approach.6 7 Even
after the "check-the-box" regulations disconnected LLC structure
from partnership tax classification,68 this aspect of LLC law
remained virtually unchanged across the country.69 And LLC
statutes follow partnership law in using the charging order remedy
to protect both the entity and aggregate aspects of the LLC.
Moreover, the LLC is as much a creature of a contract among its
members as it is an entity created pursuant to statute. 70 The

B.

Although the
emphasized language reflects the entity construct, what is being protected from
intrusion is the management relations inter se the partners.
63. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 5.05[1][e], n.235.20; see also
Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 2, at 1215 (explaining that derivative
claims belong to the entity rather than to its owners).
UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 703 cmt. (2001) (emphasis added).

64.

REVISED

UNIF. P'sip ACT § 405 cmt. 2 (1997).

65. Id. § 405(b); Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2005)
("[Tihe partners in a general partnership owe fiduciary obligations to each other
....So the plaintiffs were not required to file this as a derivative, or any kind
of representative, suit. The plaintiffs could sue, and are suing, on their own
behalf rather than on behalf of the partnership.").
66. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, J§ 5.06[6] [b], 10.01[2] [b].
67. In re Deluca, 194 B.R. 65, 74 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) ("ITihe fact that
membership interests in a limited liability company, unlike shares of stock in a
corporation, are not freely transferable mirrors the restriction on entry of new
members into a partnership, which ordinarily cannot occur without the
agreement of all existing members."); see generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, note
26, 8.06[11[b].
68. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 1.01[31 [e]; KLEINBERGER, supra
note 17, § 13.3.5.
1.01 In contrast, the "check69. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
the-box" regulations led to a wave of changes in other "Kintner-sensitive" areas.
Id.
5.06, 8.06.
70. Poore v. Fox Hollow Enters., No. C.A. 93A-09-005, 1994 WL 150872, at
*2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1994) ("[An LLC is largely a creature of contractwith management, economic, voting and other rights and obligations being
primarily specified in the LLC agreement"); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §
110, Reporters' Notes (2005 Annual Meeting draft) ("A limited liability company
is as much a creature of contract as of statute, and the operating agreement is
the 'cornerstone' of the typical LLC."); BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
14.02 [6] [d] ("[U]nder Delaware law, an LLC is as much a creature of contract
as of statute."); Susan Kalinka, 9 LA. CIv. L. TREATISE, LLC & PARTNERSHIP Bus.
& TAX PLAN § 1.1 (3d ed.) ("An LLC is a creature of contract."); Charles W.
Murdock, Limited Liability Companies In The Decade Of The 1990s: Legislative
and Case Law Developments and Their Implications For The Future, 56 Bus.
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member's contract-their operating agreement-is typically the
constitution of the enterprise. The Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act ("ULLCA"), for example, provides that, subject to a
short list of protected statutory provisions, "all members of a limited
liability company may enter into an operating agreement... to
regulate the affairs of the company [i.e., of the entity] and the
conduct of its business, and to govern relations among the members,
managers, and company."7 ULLCA further provides that, as far as
issues inter se members, managers and transferees, the operating
agreement is more powerful than the articles of organization (the
publicly-filed document that creates the LLC).7 '
Many state LLC acts expressly exalt freedom of contract and
seek to maximize the members' rights to structure their inter se
relationship (and therefore much of the entity) as they see fit. 73 The

Delaware Supreme Court has aptly characterized the members'
Where the
agreement as the organizational "cornerstone."74
foundational document is contractual and the owners comprise the
parties, the entity is, in some very important ways, devolved into an
aggregate.75
C.

And Even of the Close Corporation
As for the law of close corporations, the jurisprudence of
corporate law has long included aggregate-like constructs as
However, these
alternatives to the separate entity concept. 6
LAw. 499, 518 (2001) ("LLCs are essentially creatures of contract, with the
statute generally only providing default provisions."); see also Walker v. Res.
Dev. Co. Ltd., 791 A.2d 799, 813 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("LLC members' rights begin
with and typically end with the Operating Agreement.").
71. UNIF. LTD. LLAB. Co. ACT § 103(a) (1996).
72. Id. § 203(c).
73. In this, as in many other areas of LLC law, Delaware has been the
initiator with other states emulating. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101(b)
(1999) ("It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements."); IDAHO CODE § 53-668(1) (Michie 2003); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12.1367(B) (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-65(A) (Michie 2003);
10.06[2] [d], 14.02[1].
BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
74. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999)
(describing the LLC agreement as the organization's "cornerstone").
75. My thanks to my colleague, Professor Raleigh Levine, who in
conversation applied this term to the phenomenon.
76. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 78 (3d
ed. 1983) (listing, inter alia, the following theories: fiat, realist, enterprise,
symbol, contract). Nineteenth century United States Supreme Court cases
flirted with an aggregate construct of the corporation. See, e.g., Pembina
Consol. Silver Min.& Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1888)
(stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "was designed to prevent any person
or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating
and hostile legislation" and that "[u]nder the designation of 'person' there is no
doubt that a private corporation is included" because "[sluch corporations are
merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose, and permitted to
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constructs have had little practical effect on close corporation law.77
Decades ago, most courts (or legislatures) accepted the notion that
shareholders in close corporation should be able to "predetermine
their deal" by agreement and, for inter se purposes, dissolve the
formal tripartite structure of the corporation into whatever
aggregation of relationships that agreement might provide. 8
For that reason the "action" has since focused on relations and
Issues of "oppression" and
duties inter se the shareholders. 9
"reasonable expectations" are the most salient part of close
corporation law, and courts and commentators sometimes even refer
to the close corporation as an "incorporated partnership. '80
do business under a particular name, and have a succession of members
The Supreme Court's first opinion on diversity
without dissolution").
jurisdiction for business organizations took an aggregate approach, but the
Court embraced the entity view 35 years later. See supra note 42. For an
introduction to the more modern debate between "the theory of the firm" and
the "nexus of contracts," see PALMITER, supra note 1, § 1.1.2. For an argument
that the construct chosen should influence the law's regulatory approach to the
enterprise, see Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the
Corporation,4 SuP. CT. EcON. REV. 95 (1995). For an argument that the entity
theory should be reasserted in the realm of public corporation law following "a
span of perhaps twenty years when a highly 'disaggregated' conception of
corporate relations-the nexus of contracts theory-has predominated," see Lyman
P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why CorporateOfficers Are Fiduciaries,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1604 (2005).
77. It is tempting, but would be incorrect, to adduce the piercing doctrine
as a reflection of the aggregate construct. In theory, piercing does disregard the
juridical distinction between and entity and its owners. Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003) (noting that the "Veil separating
corporations and their shareholders may be pierced in some circumstances"); In
re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Cherry v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 162 N.C. App. 535, 538, 590 S.E.2d 925, 929
(2004) ("The doctrine of disregarding a corporation's separate and independent
existence is commonly referred to as piercing the corporate veil ... ."); see also
JAMES D. COX, ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 7.3 (1997); WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (perm. ed.
1999). However, piercing cases typically involve a single dominant owner.
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1054-56 (1991). Therefore, although piercing conflates a
juridical entity and its "alter ego," the doctrine does not typically implicate the
entity-aggregate dichotomy. An aggregate has at least two members.
78. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 1150-51.
79. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS & LLC MEMBERS, § 7:2 (3d ed. 2004).
80. Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind.
1998) ("Indiana courts have characterized closely-held corporations as
'incorporated partnerships' and as such have imposed a fiduciary duty upon
shareholding 'partners' to deal fairly not only with the corporation but with
fellow shareholders as well."); Trieweiler v. Sears, 689 N.W.2d 807, 837-38
(Neb. 2004) (deciding to adopt the ALI's rule for overriding the direct-derivative
distinction in closely held corporations and explaining that "a closely held
corporation may be treated, in effect, as an incorporated partnership, and a
significant difference in legal treatment is unwarranted, as the concept of a
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LLC law has begun to follow suit, recognizing fiduciary duties
than run among the members (i.e., within the aggregate)."'
NCCUSL's ongoing project to draft a "second generation" uniform
LLC act has recognized this phenomenon,"2 as well as
commentators.8 '
Thus, were the entity-aggregate dichotomy itself a person, it
might quote Twain and announce: "[t]he reports of my death are
greatly exaggerated."'
V.

BUT DOES IT MATTER? - OCCAM VERSUS WEBER

Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote that "[a] foolish consistency is the
hobgoblin of little minds," 5 and Professor Rosin has argued that the
entity-aggregate debate is either much ado about nothing or much
ado about the wrong thing.8 6 Does it matter, to either academics or
practitioners that the entity-aggregate dichotomy persists in the law
For a combination of pedagogical,
of closely held businesses?
theoretical, and practical reasons, I believe that the answer is yes.

corporate injury that is distinct from any injury to the shareholders approaches
the fictional in the case of a firm with only a handful of shareholders");
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 288, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557 (1983) ("[Tlhe
commentators all appear to agree that [cilose corporations are often little more
than incorporated partnerships" (internal quotation omitted)); AMERICAN LAW
AND
ANALYSIS
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
OF
INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01 cmt. (d) (1992); WILLIAM MEAD FLETCHER, 8 FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3997.20 (Perm. Ed. 2001)

("The term incorporated partnership has been used in reference to close
corporations and generally denotes a corporate entity in which the participants
interact in a manner akin to partners."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 297 (1986)
("That closely held corporations are really 'incorporated partnerships' is a
common refrain."); Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 2, at 1204.
81. E.g., Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 899
(N.D. Ind. 2002).
82. See REVISED UNIF. LIAB. Co. ACT § 701, Reporters' Notes (2005 Annual
Meeting draft).
83. See, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing
ContractualFreedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraintson Opportunistic
and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2004); Douglas
K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or
Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 965-67
(2005); see generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 10.09.
84. Twain cabled this statement from London to newspapers in the United
States after reading his own obituary, which had been published by mistake.
THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (E.D. Hirsch, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed.
2002), available at http://www.answers.com/topic/the-reports-of-my-death-aregreatly-exaggerated (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
85. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF RELIANCE IN ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES 54
(John W. Lovell Co. 1964) (1841).
86. Rosin, supra note 16, at 400 (arguing that the distinction involves a
diverting and misleading formalism that ought to be replaced with a more
functional approach).
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A.

Pedagogy and Theory
In the teaching of law, it is important to inculcate both an
ability and affinity for precision. Vagueness can be sloppiness,
which never helps a client, or an opening for arbitrariness. 8 To a
large extent, law as a system of ideas is about "categories and
88 and what might be decried as "hair splitting" can
consequences,"
mean the difference between the life and death of an individual or of
a business that provides the livelihoods and contains dreams of
numerous individuals. It is not pettifogging but proficiency that
comes from the proper determination of how many angels can dance
on the head of a pin. 9
87. Recall, for example, Lord Selden's criticism of the vagueness of equity:
Equity is a roguish thing. For Law we have a measure, know what to
trust to. Equity is according to the conscience of him that is
Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one
as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a, foot a
Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure that would be! One
Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent
foot. 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's conscience.
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Sir Frederick Pollack ed., 1927)
(1689) (edited from Old English). Imprecision can also make life difficult for
courts, as Judge Easterbrook has complained in the context of determining the
citizenship of business organization in federal diversity cases:
Indeed, no matter what feature one names as the potential dividing
line [between organizations treated as corporations and those treated
as aggregates of their members], it is possible to find a decision of the
Supreme Court on the other side. That makes life hard for an
intermediate appellate court. We must choose between letting
nomenclature control and trying vainly to identify which legal
characteristics distinguish corporations from other entities. The
former approach is wrong in principle, the latter untenable in practice.
Forced to choose between these options, I join the majority in thinking
that it is better to let names control than to set off on a snipe hunt.
Carden,the Court's most recent word, is essentially formal.
Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737,
747 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
88. KLEINBERGER, supra note 17, at xxiv.
89. Dorothy Sayres made this point in her 1947 Oxford lecture, which has
come to be known as "The Lost Tools of Learning":
A glib speaker ... once entertained his audience.., by asserting
that in the Middle Ages it was a matter of faith to know how many
archangels could dance on the point of a needle. I need not say, I
hope, that it never was a "matter of faith"; it was simply a debating
exercise, whose set subject was the nature of angelic substance: were
angels material, and if so, did they occupy space? The answer usually
adjudged correct is, I believe, that angels are pure intelligences; not
material, but limited, so that they may have location in space but not
extension. An analogy might be drawn from human thought, which is
similarly non-material and similarly limited. Thus, if your thought is
concentrated upon one thing-say, the point of a needle-it is located
there in the sense that it is not elsewhere; but although it is "there," it
occupies no space there, and there is nothing to prevent an infinite
number of different people's thoughts being concentrated upon the
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"The medium is [at least part of] the message,"9 and the law
itself can and should teach precision. We ought not to settle for the
vagueness inherent in oscillating constructs, unless there is a
demonstrable value in doing so and that value outweighs the costs of
having the law itself teach imprecision.
Moreover, precision is a precondition for predictability, and the
law dealing with business structures ought especially to strive for
predictability. Any other approach devalues that law itself in the
eyes of the business people for whom that law is primarily
designed.9 1 Entrepreneurs understand that often they must make
business decisions on the basis of incomplete, vague, and otherwise
imperfect business information. 2 However, they intensely dislike
any situation in which imprecision in the applicable legal rules
materially contributes to the imperfection. They believe that law
same needle-point at the same time. The proper subject of the
argument is thus seen to be the distinction between location and
extension in space; the matter on which the argument is exercised
happens to be the nature of angels (although, as we have seen, it
might equally well have been something else); the practical lesson to
be drawn from the argument is not to use words like "there" in a loose
and unscientific way, without specifying whether you mean "located
there" or "occupying space there."
Scorn in plenty has been poured out upon the mediaeval passion
for hair-splitting; but when we look at the shameless abuse made, in
print and on the platform, of controversial expressions with shifting
and ambiguous connotations, we may feel it in our hearts to wish that
every reader and hearer had been so defensively armored by his
education as to be able to cry: "Distinguo."
Dorothy Sayers, Speech at Oxford (1947), at http://www.gbt.org//textl
sayers.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
90. MARSHALL McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA 7 (McGraw-Hill Book
Co. 1964).
91. Obviously, regulatory law is designed to protect public interests, and
third party and social concerns influence and are part of "business law" as well.
But most of modern "business law" is designed to facilitate commercial and
other business transactions. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-103(1)(a)(1)-(2) (2003) (stating
that the "underlying purposes and policies" of the UCC include "to simplify,
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions" and "to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage,
and agreement of the parties"); id. §1-103 cmt. 1 (stating that "The Uniform
Commercial Code is drawn to provide flexibility so that .. .it will provide its
own machinery for expansion of commercial practices"); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT,
Prefatory Note (2001) (explaining that "[tihe Act's rules, and particularly its
default rules, have been designed to reflect [certain] assumptions" about what
"people utilizing [the Act] will want").
92. The necessity of making decisions in such circumstances is part of the
justification for the business judgment rule. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886
(2d Cir. 1982) (explaining the business judgment rule in part by stating that
"business imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less
than perfect information," and adding that "[tihe entrepreneur's function is to
encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time
made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of
perfect knowledge").
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ought to be able at least to explain clearly what it wants and decry
the law when "it can't seem to make up its mind."93
But perhaps modem law-like other norms-is inevitably of two
(or more) minds. In contemporary Western society, a multitude of
voices declare for relativism and from that premise argue that
conceptual consistency is not only foolish but often oppressive. For
almost forty years, my favorite authority on relativism has been the
German sociologist, Max Weber, who wrote that "[a]ll knowledge of
cultural reality is .

.

. merely knowledge from particular points of

view."94 Invoking Weber in this context is particularly fitting. He
pioneered the notion of "ideal types," 95 and the entity/aggregate

constructs are the law's version of an ideal type or at least a close
cousin. 96
But sociology is analytic, and law is prescriptive. A multitude of
viewpoints might be fruitful in the former and problematic in the
latter, especially in a society that considers justice to include the
notion of "treating like things alike."97 Perhaps when articulating
concepts that drive practical decisions, we should eschew Weber's
relativism in favor of Occam's Razor: Pluralitasnon est ponenda sine
98
necessitate. ("Plurality should not be posited without necessity.")

93. The author rests these assertions on more than twenty-five years of
experience counseling business clients and advising their attorneys. For a more
theoretical approach to a business strategist's view of legal uncertainty, see
Richard Shell & Dennis Yao, Business Strategy in a World with Uncertain
Rules (February
11, 2000),
at http://rider.wharton.upenn.edul-yao/
uncertainrules.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
94. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY (H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills trans., eds., Oxford University Press
1958).
95. See generally id.; MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (Edward Shils and Henry Finch trans., eds., Free Press 1949).
96. Weber described an ideal type as an abstract depiction of a social
phenomenon which summed up the phenomenon's essential character but
would rarely, if ever, be realized in all its particulars. See Ernest E. Best, Max
Weber and the Christian Criticism of Life, 16 THEOLOGY TODAY 203, 207 (1959),
available at http://theologytoday.ptsem.edu/jull959/v16-2-article5.htm) (last
visited Aug. 26, 2005).
97. E.g., Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that "equal treatment" includes at its core "treating like things alike" as
well "treating unlike things differently according to their differences").
98. There are many descriptions of the history of Occam's Razor:
Occam's Razor (also Ockham's Razor or any of several other spellings),
is a principle attributed to the 14th century English logician and
Franciscan friar, William of Ockham that forms the basis of
methodological reductionism, also called the principle of parsimony.
In its simplest form, Occam's Razor states that one should not make
more assumptions than needed. When multiple explanations are
available for a phenomenon, the simplest version is preferred.
OCCAM'S RAZOR, WIKIPEDIA ON-LINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/Occam'sRazor (last visited Aug. 26, 2005); see also DAVE BECKETr,
WILLIAM

OF

OCCAM,

at

http://wotug.ukc.ac.uk/parallel/www/occam/occam-

bio.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2005) ("The medieval rule of parsimony, or
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Put another way: those who favor oscillating constructs have the
burden of proof.
B.

The PracticalEvidence
The argument for Occam over Weber is supported by a large
number of practical problems produced by entity-aggregate
confusion. This section discusses several examples.

1. Federal Employment Law and the Shareholder-Employeein
the Close Corporation
One of the most interesting examples concerns the question of
whether a shareholder-employee of a closely-held corporation is an
"employee" for the purposes of federal employment law statutes. 99
The question matters in two related contexts: (i) whether these
statutes protect an individual who provides services to the
corporation
through
an
employment
relationship
while
simultaneously co-owning the employer corporation (eligible
plaintiff); and (ii) whether such individuals count toward the
numerical thresholds most of the statutes contain for determining
whether an employer is large enough to be subject to the statute's
control (covered defendant). 100 The question is difficult, because
these federal statutes define the core concepts of "employer" and
"employee" with "magnificent circularity"'1 '-i.e.,an employee is an
"individual employed by an employer." 2
Almost all cases agree that the employee vel non question
involves the same analysis in both the eligible plaintiff and covered
defendant contexts.'0 3 However, until 2003 there was a significant
split in the circuits as to what that analysis should be, and that split
can usefully be understood as reflecting an entity-aggregate divide.
In most circuits before 2003, the answer to the employee vel non
question depended on whether the shareholder-employer could be
analogized to a partner. Decisions from these circuits treated the
employer/employee characterization as dichotomous and held that
an individual cannot properly be seen as an employee when he or
she is part of the group comprising the employer. These decisions
principle of economy, frequently used by Ockham came to be known as
Ockham's razor. The rule, which said that plurality should not be assumed
without necessity (or, in modern English, keep it simple, stupid), was used to
eliminate many pseudo-explanatory entities.").
99. The following discussion is based on Daniel S. Kleinberger,
"Magnificent Circularity"and the Churkendoose: LLC Members and Federal
Employment Law, 22 OKLA.. CITY U. L. REV. 477 (1997) and BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
1.06(21.
100. Kleinberger, supra note 99, at 506-07.
101. Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986).
102. The same formulation appears in several statutes. See Kleinberger,
supra note 99, at 479, nn.2, 4.
103. Id. at 508.
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trace back to Justice Powell's famous concurrence in Hishon v. King
& Spalding,04 and read that concurrence to mean that, in a
traditional general partnership, the partners collectively (one might
say "in the aggregate") are the employer and therefore cannot be
employees for federal employment law purposes.105
Beginning in 1986, the Second Circuit took a radically different
approach, deeming the partnership analogy foreclosed by the entity
nature of a corporation. In Hyland v. New Haven Radiology
Associates, PC., the court proclaimed that an enterprise's use of the
corporate form "precludes any examination designed to determine
whether the entity is in fact a partnership."'0 6 In other words, form
rather than function controls; "live by the entity, die by the entity."
Seven years later, in a slightly different context, the circuit flirted
in 1996 the circuit
with a less categorical approach,0 7 but
10 8
rule.
emphatically reaffirmed the Hyland

Clackamas
decided
Court
Supreme
2003,
the
In
the
Second
rejecting
both
GastroenterologyAssociates, PC. v. Wells,
Circuit's "live by the entity, die by the entity" formalism and the use
by other circuits of the partnership analogy.'09 The case involved the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), invoked against a
professional corporation by a terminated employee. The corporation
asserted that it had too few employees for the ADA to apply, and
that issue turned on "whether four physicians actively engaged in
medical practice as shareholders and directors of a professional
corporation should be counted as 'employees. '
During the lower court proceedings, each side of the circuit split
had temporarily prevailed."' The case was tried to a magistrate,2
who analogized the shareholder-physicians to genuine partners'
and recommended dismissing the case. The district court judge
relied on the magistrate's report and implemented the
recommendation. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed,
with two judges following the formalist approach articulated by the
104. 467 U.S. 69, 79-81 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
105. Kleinberger, supra note 99, at 553-55.
106. 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986).
107. Frankel v. Balley, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering
whether the sole shareholder/employee of a corporation could be considered for
ADEA purposes as the employee of another entity for which the corporation
(and its shareholder/employee) provided services and stating that, at least in
that context, "the corporate form under which a plaintiff does business is not
dispositive in a determination of whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor within the meaning of the ADEA").
108. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1538 (2d Cir. 1996).
109. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
110. Id. at 442.
111. For the Supreme Court's account of the case's history, see id. at 442-44.
112. For a discussion of the pre-Clackamas case law that took this approach,
see Kleinberger, supra note 99, at 539-42 and BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 26,

1.04[31 [f] [ii].
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Second Circuit in Hyland and the other dissenting vigorously.
The Supreme Court rejected both the "partner analogy" and the
Hyland approach as inconsistent with the lesson taught by
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,"' which has become the Court's
seminal decision in this area. 14 Darden teaches that, in finding
meaning for the term "employee," the proper focus is the common
law concept of a servant.115 Consistent with that focus, the Court
took guidance from the EEOC's Compliance Manual, which states a6
non-exhaustive list of factors for determining employee status.1
The Court also embraced the view that the employer/employee
characterization is dichotomous, stating that "our inquiry is whether
a shareholder-director is an employee or, alternatively, the
1 7 kind of
person that the common law would consider an employer."
The Court then held that, in the context of a closely held
business that has more than one owner, "an employer is the person,
or group of persons, who owns and manages the enterprise. The
employer can hire and fire employees, can assign tasks to employees
and supervise their performance, and can decide how the profits and
losses of the business are to be distributed."" 8
In short, under Clackamas it is irrelevant whether the business
is housed in an entity juridically separate from its owners, and the
separation of the juridical entity from its owners is beside the point.
What matters are the relationships of those owners within the
organization. To transpose the holding into the language of class
politics, for the purposes of federal employment law statutes, a
person cannot be both an "employee" of a closely held business and a
member of the enterprise's ruling class." 9
Obviously, this approach rejects Hyland: the entity does not
Perhaps less
matter; the characteristics of the aggregate do.
obviously but nonetheless inescapably, the approach also reveals the
"partnership analogy" cases to have been looking at the right
relationships but asking the wrong question. The partnership
analogy was an aggregate analogy, 20 and the Supreme Court had no
113. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
114. For a discussion of Darden and its importance in this area of federal
law, see Kleinberger, supra note 99, at 494-502 and BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,
supra note 26, 1.06[3] [a].
115. Darden, 503 U.S. at 319; see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
1.06[3] [a]; Kleinberger, supra note 99, at 494-95.
116. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449.
117. Id. at 445, n.5.
118. Id. at 1680 (emphasis added).
1.06[4][d]; see also
119. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
Kleinberger, supra note 99, at 571 (stating of one plaintiff: "To characterize
Caruso as a member of Peat Marwick's ruling class would be absurd. He was
merely at the top level of those who were ruled.").
120. The "partnership analogy" cases took for granted the non-entity view of
a partnership and made nothing of the way the UPA and RUPA approach the
entity-aggregate mix question. For these cases, the touchstone was instead
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problem with the notion of looking through the form of entity to
discern correctly the relationships among the entity's owners. From
the Supreme Court's perspective, the problem was that the
"partnership analogy" cases assessed the aggregate to determine
whether the alleged "employee" resembled a genuine "partner."
Consistent with Darden, the proper question was whether the
shareholder resembled a genuine "employee" or, instead, was part of
the "employer."
Thus, in the Second Circuit, a preoccupation with "entity"
caused the courts to completely ignore the correct analysis, while in
other circuits a preoccupation with a particular aggregate construct
caused the courts to "grab hold of the wrong end of the stick."
2. The Direct-DerivativeDistinction
Another example of confusion engendered by the entityaggregate issue is found in the law distinguishing direct from
derivative claims in the context of closely held businesses. Most of
these cases are corporate, but LLC cases are now appearing as
well. 121
From a strict entity perspective, the analysis is
straightforward: unless the plaintiff can plead and prove a direct
injury-i.e., one suffered not merely as result of an injury to the
entity12 2-the claim must be brought derivatively. The derivative
route involves not only a demand requirement but also the
23 prospect
of the dreaded (or vaunted) special litigation committee.'1
In 1992, the ALI recommended a close corporation "override" to
the direct-derivative distinction.

Justice Powell's "ideal type" of a traditional general partnership.
121. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, %10.01 [2][b][i] (Supp. 05-1).
122. Some jurisdictions still use the "special injury" rule for distinguishing
direct from derivative claims. See, e.g., Popp Telecom, Inc. v. Am. Sharecom,
Inc., 361 F.3d 482, 492 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that any injury dissenting
shareholders incurred from claimed breaches of fiduciary duty were derivative
because they were "not separate and distinct from the injury to other minority
shareholders"); Houbigant, Inc. v. Dev. Specialists, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 208,
214 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that a plaintiff has standing to bring a direct
lawsuit only if the plaintiff can allege an injury "separate and distinct from that
suffered by other shareholders," or an injury based on a contractual right). This
is error. Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 2, at 1251-52. However, the
error is irrelevant to the analysis presented here.
123. The ALI had addressed the issue of derivative actions in such
circumstances:
In practice, the most important result of characterizing an action as
direct or derivative is the tendency for derivative actions to be more
complex procedurally and to impose additional restrictions on the
eligibility of the plaintiffs who may maintain them. For these
reasons, the plaintiff usually wishes to characterize the action as
direct, while the defendant prefers to characterize it as derivative.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 80, § 7.01 cmt. D; see also supra notes 1
and 2.
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In the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its
discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a
direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and defenses
applicable only to derivative actions, and order an
individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not (i)
unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a
multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests
of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair
distribution of the recovery among all interested persons. 24
The ALI position was always the minority view and remains so
today. It does, however, have its adherents, 125 and courts that have
adopted the approach for close corporations will likely do so for
LLCs. That is what happened recently, for example, in Georgia,
where the court of appeals extrapolated from long-standing Georgia
corporate case law to adopt the override approach for LLCs. 26
124. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 80, § 7.01(d) (internal crossreference omitted). The ALI relied in part on Donahue, 328 N.E.2d 505, which
the ALI characterized as an "action alleg[ing] in substance a corporate injury,"
which produced a ruling "that a closely held corporation may be treated as
essentially an incorporated partnership [for the purposes of] grant[ing] a
minority shareholder the right to sue individually." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note 80, § 7.01 cmt. e. In fact, Donahue held very much to the contrary,
disregarding derivative claims stated in the complaint and recognizing a direct
"equal opportunity" right for the plaintiff shareholder.
In form, the plaintiffs bill of complaint presents, at least in part, a
derivative action, brought on behalf of the corporation, and, in the
words of the bill, 'on behalf of . . . (the) stockholders' of Rodd

Electrotype. Yet, as noted in footnote 2, supra, the plaintiffs bill, in
substance, was one seeking redress because of alleged breaches of the
fiduciary duty owed to her, a minority stockholder, by the controlling
stockholders. We treat that bill of complaint (as have the parties) as
presenting a proper cause of suit in the personal right of the plaintiff.
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 508, n.4.
125. Simmons v. Miller 544 S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va. 2001) (declining to adopt
the closely held corporation exception and noting that "[diespite [its] gaining
some judicial acceptance over the past decade, the closely held corporation
exception is not the majority rule and has been subject to criticism"); RALPH C.
FERRARA

ET

AL.,

SHAREHOLDER

DERIVATIVE

LITIGATION,

§

1.02[2]

(2003)

("Delaware and most other states have not adopted the so-called 'closely held
corporation exception.'"); James R. Burkhard, LLC Member and Limited
Partner Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims: Direct or Derivative Actions? 7 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 19, 53 (2003) (stating that twelve states have

adopted the ALI provision for close corporations). But see Durham v. Durham,
871 A.2d 41, 45-46 (N.H. 2005) (reviewing carefully both sides of the issue and
choosing the override approach).
126. Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 615 S.E.2d 1, 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) ("With
respect to the two-member LLCs at issue ... [slince both members of the LLC in
each claim are parties to the suit, we find no danger of multiple suits and no
concern that a recovery would prejudice the rights of the other member.
Moreover, a direct suit with all the members joined may prevent a defendant
member from inappropriately sharing in the recovery, while providing an
appropriate recovery to a plaintiff member who would gain no benefit from a
derivative recovery on behalf of the LLC given the lack of a ready market for
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The ALI override devolves an entity into an aggregate of its
owners, in effect replacing the entity-respecting derivative claim
with something approaching an action for an accounting in a
partnership. As explained by the ALI, "the concept of a corporate
injury that is distinct from any injury to the shareholders
approaches the fictional in the case of a firm with only a handful of
shareholders." 27
The problem with this approach is that it does not adequately
understand (let alone take into account) the consequences of shifting
from the entity construct to the aggregate. The ALI assumed that
the procedural consequences of the direct-derivative distinction had
no place in a close corporation, 28 and was content to let the courts
decide-without any additional guideposts 129-when to order the
shift. But the procedural consequences of the distinction are not
inevitably bulwarks for the oppressor. They may instead be an
important part of the balance of power between majority and
minority owners. In particular, those consequences help prevent a
simple dispute over business judgment from becoming full-fledged
litigation at the whim of a disgruntled holder of a minority
interest.3
In this context, the notion that the entity might be a
closely held LLC interests. Finally, as to protection of LLC creditors, the record
does not reflect any evidence of existing creditors, and none of the members
have offered evidence of existing creditors.").
127. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 80, § 7.01 cmt. e. The concept of a
corporate injury is, of course, important to protect creditors of the corporation,
but § 7.01(d)(ii) recognizes that.
128. The ALI has stated as follows:
[Tihe procedural rules often applicable to derivative actions-such as
a requirement that the plaintiff shareholder post a security-forexpenses bond-often make little sense in the context of a dispute
between persons who are effectively incorporated partners. These
rules were essentially intended to protect public corporations against
'strike suits' by plaintiffs holding only a nominal interest in the firm.
Id. § 7.01 cmt. e. Close corporations are subject to their own type of strike suits.
E.g., Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 836, 838 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) (affirming buy-out, without any discount, of a shareholder employee
who had "pleaded guilty to assaulting someone in the scope of his
employment"); Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 137 N.C. App. 700, 703,
709, 529 S.E.2d 515, 517, 521 (2000) (ordering dissolution in connection with
the claim of a shareholder whom "independent counsel ...[had] concluded...
had committed various acts of sexual harassment").
129. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 80, § 7.01 cmt. e (stating that
when the section's enumerated policy considerations are satisfied, "[t]he court
should then have equitable power to treat the action as direct if the corporation
is closely held" but stating no further guidelines for the exercise of that
equitable power).
130. I have argued elsewhere that there is a better approach available for
deciding when to override the direct-derivative distinction, Kleinberger &
Bergmanis, supra note 2, at 1271, and for a brief and shining moment one court
seemed interested. Wessin v. Archives Corp., 581 N.W2d 380, 390-91 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998), rev'd Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1999).
However, a higher court had other ideas. Wessin, 592 N.W.2d at 466.
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fiction caused the ALI to ignore the subtleties inherent in the
aggregate.
3. RUPA's Elimination of Partner-to-PartnerFiduciaryDuties
A different but related type of entity-aggregate confusion exists
under RUPA, which neither provides for nor permits derivative
suits. 3 ' RUPA section 405(b) expressly authorizes a partner to bring
a direct claim to enforce "the partner's rights under section 404," and
section 404(a) states, "the fiduciary duties a partner owes to the
At first glance, this
partnership and the other partners."3 2
formulation suggests that a partner has standing to make claims for
both indirect harms (to the partnership) and direct harms (to the
partner) resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty. Certainly, the
former part of that proposition is true.133 The latter, however, is not.
Section 404 provides an exhaustive list of fiduciary duties; each
listed duty protects the partnership entity rather than the partner.
For example, section 404(b) states that "[a] partner's duty of loyalty
to the partnership and the other partners is limited to" refraining
from:

misusing

opportunities;

partnership

self-dealing

property;

and

dealing

usurping

partnership

adversely

partnership; 136 and competing with the partnership.

37

with

the

Similarly,

although the duty of care is stated as running to both "the
partnership and the other partners," the scope of the duty is
confined to "the conduct and winding up of the partnership
business." 3 '
Thus, while RUPA grants each partner standing to sue on
fiduciary breaches that harm the entity, RUPA precludes a partner
from claiming direct, individual injury resulting from a breach of

131. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 405 cmt. 2 (1997) states in relevant part:
"Under subsection (b), a partner may bring a direct suit against the partnership
or another partner for almost any cause of action arising out of the conduct of
the partnership business .... Since general partners are not passive investors
like limited partners, RUPA does not authorize derivative actions . . . ." But see
Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2005), which involves a
partner's direct claim and states that "a derivative suit can be brought on
behalf of a partnership." The context suggests that "partnership" includes
"general partnership," which is incorrect, and, in any event, mere dicta.
132. REVISED UNIF. P'smp ACT § 404(a) (referring to subsections b and c,
whch describe duties of loyalty and care).
133. E.g., Lefkovitz, 395 F.3d at 777 ("[Tlhe partners in a general
partnership owe fiduciary obligations to each other .... So the plaintiffs were
not required to file this as a derivative, or any kind of representative, suit. The
plaintiffs could sue, and are suing, on their own behalf rather than on behalf of
the partnership.").
134. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b)(1) (1997).
135. Id. § 404(b)(1).
136. Id. § 404(b)(2).
137. Id. § 404(b)(3).
138. Id. § 404(c).
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"the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive."'3 9 The injury might
exist, but the breach cannot. In this respect, RUPA has made
general partnerships more entity-like than close corporations.
This situation is highly ironic, given that the law of close
corporations developed its modem concept of shareholder-toshareholder fiduciary duties by analogizing the close corporation to
a partnership and importing into close corporation law "partner-topartner" fiduciary duties. 4
And in this area, entity-aggregate
confusion has produced more than irony; it has forced RUPA's
codified obligation of good faith and fair dealing to serve as the
statute's sole catch-all source of partner-to-partner obligations141
That is an uncomfortable role for what is essentially a contractbased obligation whose ordinary function is merely "to protect
agreed-upon arrangements from conduct that is manifestly beyond
what a reasonable person could have contemplated when the
139. The quoted phrase is, of course, Cardozo's in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928), and emphasizes partner-to-partner fiduciary duties:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule
of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.
Id. at 546 (internal citation omitted).
140. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 ("Because of the fundamental resemblance
of the close corporation to the partnership ...

we hold that stockholders in the

close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty ... that
partners owe to one another."); Russell v. First York Sav. Co., 352 N.W.2d 871,
874 (Neb. 1984) (stating that shareholders owed minority shareholder who
objected to the plan for the corporation's liquidation the same fiduciary duties
that partners owe each other); overruled on other grounds by Van Pelt v.

Greathouse, 364 N.W.2d 14, 18-20 (Neb. 1985); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d
383, 387-88 (N.D. 1987) (applying Donahue to find majority shareholder owed
fired minority shareholder fiduciary duties); DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body,
Inc., 755 A.2d 757, 770 n.14 (R.I. 2000) (holding that when attorneys seek
ownership interests in close corporations that they also represent, they must
comply with the "applicable" fiduciary duties, "includ[ing] the duties of care and
loyalty that shareholders owe to one another in close corporations that are akin
to those of partners in a partnership"); see also Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder
Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation,60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
841, 851-52 (2003) (quoting Donahue); Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 1153

(referring to "partner-like rights").
141. REVISED UNIF. P'sHip ACT § 404(d) (1997) ("A partner shall discharge
the duties to the partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under
the partnership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.")
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The codified obligation is thus
arrangements were made."
"ancillary" to express duties and rights, not a method for discerning
necessary to the general policing of a
(and adding) protections
14 3
fiduciary relationship.

This lack of fit is particularly problematic in partner-to-partner
transactions. Case law before RUPA's drafting makes clear that
partners have a fiduciary obligation of disclosure in such
transactions,'44 but, under RUPA, fiduciary duty is not a partner-topartner concept. RUPA's drafters apparently expected the good
faith obligation to perform in this area, as Comment 4 to RUPA
section 404 states: "In some situations the obligation of good faith
includes a disclosure component. Depending on the circumstances,
a partner may have an affirmative disclosure obligation that
supplements the section 403 duty to render information." The
problem with this assertion is that the codified obligation has a
limited scope. It applies only to "duties .. . under this [Act] or under
the partnership agreement and . . .any rights" (presumably also

under the Act or the partnership agreement). It is not clear that a
sale of an interest by one partner to another comes within that
defined scope.
This aspect of RUPA's entity-aggregate conflict is not yet
generally understood,' 45 but several commentators have identified
142. UNIF. LTD.P'sHiP ACT § 305 cmt. (b) (2001).
143. For the contract-based and ancillary nature of the codified duty, see
REVISED UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (1997) ("The obligation of good faith and
fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed on the partners because of the
consensual nature of a partnership. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (1981). It is not characterized, in RUPA, as a fiduciary duty arising out of
the partners' special relationship. Nor is it a separate and independent
obligation. It is an ancillary obligation that applies whenever a partner
discharges a duty or exercises a right under the partnership agreement or the
Act.")
144. Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P.2d 852, 859 (Colo. 1987) (stating that "each
partner has the right to demand and expect from the other a full, fair, open and
honest disclosure of everything affecting the relationship"); Herring v. Offutt,
295 A.2d 876, 879 (Md. 1972) (stating that the partnership relationship is a
fiduciary one, entailing the obligation of full disclosure regarding transactions
occurring during the partnership); Fouchek v. Janicek, 225 P.2d 783, 793 (Or.
1950) (holding that partners are obligated by their fiduciary duties to "act with
the utmost candor and good faith in their dealings between themselves").
145. RUPA is still a relatively new statute, and the problem has yet to make
itself felt in the case law. A Westlaw search for DATE(AFTER 1992) & ((RUPA
"UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT" ) /S "GOOD FAITH"), conducted April 6,
2005 in the ALLCASES database found only ten cases, only one of which was
relevant. See Della Ratta v. Larkin, 856 A.2d 643, 650, 659, n.15 (Md. 2004)
(stating that "RUPA narrowly defines the fiduciary duties of partners and
downgrades the common-law fiduciary duty of good faith to the status of a nonfiduciary 'obligation" and acknowledging that "[t]he Remaining Partners
contend that RUPA lowers the standard to which a general partner must
conform his conduct" but noting that, "[e]ven if we were to accept that
contention, under RUPA, general partners nonetheless must discharge their
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the problem. 146 The issue is one of several key points at the center of
the current NCCUSL project to draft a "second generation" uniform
limited liability company act ("RULLCA"). The following analysis
appeared in the Reporters' Notes prepared to brief the drafting
committee for its February 2005 meeting:
At its October 2004 meeting, the Drafting Committee
discussed the provisions that would deal with the
information rights and duties of LLC members at great
length. Most of the discussion concerned duties to disclose
in the context of member-to-member transactions (i.e., a
sale of an interest) and LLC-to-member transactions (e.g., a
redemption). The discussion was informed (occasionally
even learned), energetic, and inconclusive. The Committee
essentially directed the co-reporters to "see to it."
The co-reporters have concluded that the difficulty in this
area results from the Conference's decision to exclude
disclosure duties from the rubric of fiduciary duties. The
Conference first made that decision in RUPA and replicated
the decision in ULLCA and ULPA in 2001. In the opinion
of the co-reporters, the Drafting Committee has four
alternatives in this matter:
1. Have the Act remain silent on this issue, trusting to
other law and the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing.
2. Have the Act expressly refer to and preserve the
common law disclosure rules, including those that:
a. require disclosure on account of a relationship involving
trust and confidence;
b. determine when a relationship that is not a fiduciary
relationship nonetheless qualifies as one involving trust
and confidence.

duties and 'exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing'") (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-404(d) (2003)
(emphasis added by the court)).
146. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The Want of a Theory,
Again, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 719-21 (2004); J. William Callison & Allan
W. Vestal, "They've Created a Lamb with Mandibles of Death": Secrecy,
Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms, 76 IND. L.J. 271,
279-80 (2001); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User's Guide to the New Uniform
Limited PartnershipAct, 37 SUFFOLK L. REV. 583, 642-44 (2004).
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3. Include in the Act a statutory disclosure obligation
covering member-to-member transactions and LLC-tomember transactions, and perhaps also protecting
transferees.
4. Open up the Act's approach to fiduciary [duty], thereby
inviting in the developing case law in this area.
At its February 2005 meeting, the drafting committee
1481
suggesting that an
tentatively opted for the fourth alternative,
RULLCA LLC may be less of an entity (or more of an aggregate)
than a RUPA general partnership.
4. FederalDiversity Jurisdiction
The next example of entity versus aggregate dissonance is
better known, at least to those who have a litigation practice
involving limited liability companies and the federal courts. The
example concerns diversity jurisdiction.
Although an LLC may be considered an entity for other non-tax
purposes, an LLC is treated for federal diversity purposes as an
aggregate of its members. 5 ' An LLC has the citizenship of each of
its members,"' and its state of organization is irrelevant to its
147. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, § 411, Reporters' Notes (Feb. 2005
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/
draft),
Meetings
2005FebMtgDraft.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
148. Id. § 409, Reporters' Notes (May 2005 Teleconference draft), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2005MayTeleconDraft.htm (last visited
Aug 26, 2005).
149. As briefly discussed below, for income tax purposes most LLCs are
treated mostly as aggregates. See infra note 225.
150. For an introduction to this subject, see Bishop & Kleinberger, supra
note 42, at 31-36. For a detailed analysis, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 26, 1.03[31 [b].
151. See, e.g., GMAC Commercial Credit, LLC v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc.,
357 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004); Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH
Holdings, LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that, while the
Eleventh Circuit had not previously ruled on the issue, it was joining the other
circuits that had); Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt. Place, LLC, 350
F.3d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 2003); Handelsman v. Bedford Village Assocs. Ltd.
P'ship, 213 F.3d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that citizenship of an LLC was
determined by the citizenship of its members); Muhlenbeck v. KI, LLC, 304 F.
Supp. 2d 797, 798 (E.D. Va. 2004); Trident-Allied Assocs., LLC v. Cypress Creek
Assocs., LLC, 317 F. Supp. 2d 752 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Sonoma Falls Developers,
LLC v. Nev. Gold & Casinos, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 919, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
("[Clircuit courts considering the subject have uniformly concluded that LLCs
are not to be treated as corporations and instead share the citizenship of its
members."); Birdsong v. Westglen Endoscopy Ctr., LLC, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1245,
1248-49 (D. Kan. 2001) (agreeing "with the majority view [that] an LLC is a
citizen, for purposes of diversity, of each state where its members are citizens"
and applying that rule through two tiers of LLCs); South Park Assocs., LLC v.
Renzulli, 94 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that diversity
existed between an individual resident of New York and a New York landlord,
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51 2

This result is compelled by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Cardenv. Arkoma Associates,'53 and may make sense as 54a
matter of statutory construction and fealty to precedent.
Conceptually, however, neither Carden nor any of the LLC diversity
cases explain why in this realm a state law entity should be treated
as a federal law aggregate.
The conceptual disconnect has some very substantial
practical ramifications, including:
In any suit between an LLC and a member, diversity
jurisdiction is impossible. (For example, whether an
LLC sues a member for a promised contribution or a
member sues the LLC for a distribution due under the
operating agreement, the parties are not diverse. The
member and the LLC are adverse parties, and the LLC
has the citizenship of the member.)

"a Florida limited liability company whose principal place of business is in
Florida and none of whose members is a citizen of New York"); Keith v. Black
Diamond Advisors, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (following
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990)); JMTR Enters., LLC v. Duchin,
42 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93-94 (D. Mass. 1999) (following Carden and Cosgrove v.
Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998)); Int'l Flavors & Textures, LLC v.
Gardner, 966 F. Supp. 552, 554-55 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (stating that "the
Supreme Court anticipated and resolved" the question of LLCs and diversity
jurisdiction and holding that "[t]he citizenship of an unincorporated association,
at least for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is the citizenship of each of its
members . .. ,[and] that this general rule applies to entities created pursuant to
the Michigan limited liability [company] act"). Most unreported decisions agree
as well. See, e.g., Interactive Servs., Inc. v. Vista Net, LLC, No. 99 C 7948, 1999
WL 1186429 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 1999) (following Cosgrove); Gracedale Sports &
Entm't, Inc. v. Ticket Inlet, LLC, No. 99 C 2781, 1999 WL 350128 at *1 (N.D.
Ill. May 14, 1999) (following Cosgrove); Ferrara Bakery & Cafe, Inc. v. Colavita
Pasta & Olive Oil Corp., No. 98 CIV 4344 (LAP), 1999 WL 135234 at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1999); U.S.A. Seafood, LLC v. Koo, No. 97-CV-1687, 1998
WL 765160, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1998) (holding that no diversity exists
because "defendant is a member of plaintiff, a limited liability company");
Inarco Int'l Bank N.V. v. Lazard Freres & Co., No. 97 Civ. 0378 (DAB), 1998
WL 427618, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (holding it immaterial whether
defendant was limited partnership or LLC, because Carden applies equally to
both).
152. Hale v. MasterSoft Int'l Pty. Ltd., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (D. Colo.
2000) (holding that "a limited liability company is a citizen of the states of
which its members are citizens, and is not a citizen of the state in which it was
organized unless one of its members is a citizen of that state" and, therefore, a
Delaware LLC is not a citizen of Delaware when none of its members are
citizens of Delaware).
153. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
154. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 1.03[3][a]-[b].
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-

In an LLC-related suit among members of an LLC,
diversity jurisdiction depends on whether the LLC is an
indispensable party (assuming the litigating members
are diverse).

-

In any derivative lawsuit brought on behalf of an LLC
against a member (including a member-manager),
diversity jurisdiction is impossible because the LLC
itself is an indispensable party.

-

If an LLC has a member that is itself an unincorporated
organization, the LLC has the citizenship not only of
that member but also of every member of that member.

-

Federal diversity jurisdiction extends to a suit between
an LLC and a third party only if that third party is
diverse vis-A-vis every member of the LLC.

-

An LLC that invokes or challenges federal jurisdiction
must be prepared to disclose-at minimum to the court
in camera-the identity and citizenship of each of the
LLC's members.

-

Obversely, because LLC membership information is
rarely a matter of public record, a third party that
invokes diversity jurisdiction against an LLC may have
to proceed first "on information and belief" and then
promptly obtain the court's assistance to determine the
citizenship of each LLC member.155

The question of diversity jurisdiction in LLC derivative suits
further illustrates the potential distorting influence of entityaggregate oscillation. Since derivative claims belong to the entity, it
seems almost self-evident that the LLC is an indispensable party to
any derivative lawsuit brought on its behalf against one of its
members. 15 6 Such cases typically claim that a member has damaged
the entity by mismanagement, usurpation of a business opportunity,
improper competition, or failure to make a promised contribution.
"The LLC's rights are obviously in play, and the suit will determine
those rights. Whether the LLC is considered aligned with the
155. This list is drawn from Bishop & Kleinberger, supra note 42, at 35-36
and BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 1.03 [3] [b] [ii].
156. For a brief overview of indispensable party analysis in this context, see
BISHOP &KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 1.03 [3] [b] [ii]. For a detailed discussion
of "necessary" and "indispensable" parties, see 5C CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1359 (3d ed. 2004); 4
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE IT 19.03, 19.05 (3d ed.
2005).
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derivative plaintiff or the defendant, the LLC shares citizenship
with an adverse party. Such a derivative suit simply cannot qualify
for diversity jurisdiction.157

But if a federal judge wishes to retain jurisdiction over what
would normally be a derivative suit, Carden's aggregate approach
suggests a way to do so: simply extrapolate the Supreme Court's
disregard of the state law entity from one federal context (diversity)
to another (indispensable party) and then avoid the indispensable
party problem by permitting the suit to proceed directly, i.e. in the
absence of the entity.
This is precisely what happened in a 1996 limited partnership
case. In HB General Corp. v. Manchester Partners,L.P., the Third
Circuit held that a limited partnership was not an indispensable
party in a suit among the partners, because, inter alia, all the key
"players" were parties to the lawsuit and therefore the limited
partnership could be prevented from later bringing an identical
claim. As the court explained, "the Partnership, like a marionette,
cannot make a move unless some human being pulls the strings.
And all the people who, under the Partnership Agreement, have the
cause the Partnership to bring suit . . . are before the
power 15to
8
court.'

More recently, Judge Posner mused about the same approach as
applied to close corporations. 59 It appears that his thoughts went in
this direction because he was considering a general partnership case
and was intrigued by the standing of each partner to assert what
would in other contexts be the entity's claim:
[A]lthough the corporation or other entity on whose behalf a
suit is brought, being the owner of the claim sued upon,
normally is an indispensable party, this observation is
inapplicable to a suit such as the present one in which the
partner (or shareholder) is allowed to sue in an individual
157. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 1.03[31 [b] [ii].
158. 95 F.3d 1185, 1191 (3d Cir. 1996). This analysis seems perilously close
to the "real party in interest" test for which Justice O'Connor argued
unsuccessfully in Carden. 494 U.S. at 200-08 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Application of the parties to the controversy test to the limited
partnership yields the conclusion that limited partners should not be
considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Like the trust
beneficiary in Navarro, the limited partner "can neither control the
disposition of this action nor intervene in the affairs of the trust
except in the most extraordinary situations."
Id. at 205 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
159. The diversity problem is not so difficult for corporations since they have
only the citizenship of their states of incorporation and their principal place of
business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000). Still, diversity will not exist for most
close corporations in a typical derivative suit, because close corporations are
usually incorporated under the laws of the state in which one or more of the
shareholders reside.
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rather than representative capacity. The next step, which
however we [have previously] declined to take ...would be

to allow a derivative suit to be brought instead as an
individual suit whenever the corporation (the usual entity
on behalf of which a derivative suit is brought) is closely
held, at least where, as in this case (were [the general
partnership] a corporation), all the shareholders are before
the court, so that there are no merely represented
shareholders.16 °
In short, Judge Posner would consider devolving a close
corporation into an aggregate in order to preserve diversity
jurisdiction.161

5.
Transfer Restrictionson Ownership Interests
The entity-aggregate dichotomy is also reflected in the law's
approach to stock transfer restrictions. It is almost axiomatic that
owners of closely held businesses are justified in restricting each
other's ability to transfer ownership interests,1 62 but how the law
treats such restrictions depends on the form of organization that
houses the business. As previously discussed, in this realm the law
It
of partnerships and LLCs takes the aggregate approach.
embraces the "pick your partner" concept and provides transfer
restrictions as statutory default rules. 163 In contrast, the law of close
corporations is at war with itself; it oscillates between an entity
view and an aggregate view.
From the entity view, the issue is a shareholder's right to
dispose of property rights in an entity, which triggers shibboleths
about "restraints on alienation" and the "strict construction" of any
attempted restrictions.'64 These shibboleths implicate the entity
160. Lefkovitz, 395 F.3d at 777 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
161. The Seventh Circuit declined to take that step. Hoagland ex rel.
Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737,
739-40 (7th Cir. 2004).
162. F.B.I. Farms, Inc. v. Moore, 798 N.E.2d 440, 448 (Ind.2003) ("The
policy behind enforcement of these restrictions is to encourage entering into
formal partnerships by permitting all parties to have confidence they will not
involuntarily end up with an undesired co-venturer."); F. Hodge O'Neal,
Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:Planning and
Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773, 773 (1952) ("It is thus not surprising that
shareholders in a closely held enterprise usually desire to retain the power to
choose future associates. Each shareholder wants to be in a position to prevent
outsiders from entering the business if he doubts their integrity or business
judgment, or feels that working with them would be unpleasant or
unrewarding. Participants in a closely held corporation may also want to
restrict the transferability of shares in order to guard against the purchase of
shares by competitors or other persons unfriendly to the corporation."); see also
Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 1148-49.
163. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
164. These shibboleths implicate the entity view indirectly but nonetheless
fundamentally. The "restraint on alienation" analysis conceptualizes each
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view indirectly but nonetheless fundamentally. The "restraint on
alienation" analysis conceptualizes each shareholder as separate
from each other. What matters is each shareholder's ownership
interest in the separatelegal person (i.e., the entity) that is co-owned.
Only from this perspective does it make sense to view transfer
restrictions as restraints on a person's right to sell his or her
separate property.
In contrast, an aggregate view would approach each
shareholder's ownership as reflecting the shareholders relationship
with the other shareholders.
From the aggregate view, the
predominant concern is the shareholders' rights to protect their
personal relationships from unwarranted intrusion-i.e., the "pick
your partner" approach in corporate form.
Often, the same case reflects both approaches, which leads to
holdings that are both confused and confusing. A pair of cases, one
old and one new, illustrate this phenomenon. The old case is Howe
v. Roberts, which concerned an Alabama corporation whose charter
"limited the ownership of any one stockholder to 25 shares, and the
corporation's total stock issue to 400 shares."'65 The plaintiff had
acquired a total of 235 shares through various purchases and sought6 6
to compel the corporation to register those shares in his name.1
The defendant corporation asserted the twenty-five-share limitation
in its defense.
The court's analysis reflects both an entity and aggregate view.
From the entity perspective, the court stated that "[o]ne of the
incidents as of [sic] common right to the ownership of property is the
power to dispose of it at pleasure" and recognized that "shares of
stock are transferable as other personal property, and the courts
have jealously guarded facilities for the transfer of title, and all
unreasonable attempts to restrain the right to pass title have been
declared void as against public policy."

167

At the same time, the

court recognized aggregate values: "There may be good reasons why
a majority of the voting power of a corporation should not be
concentrated in a single ownership." 68 Moreover, "[tihe limitation
on the ownership of individual stockholders governs the corporation
in the management of its internal affairs."'6 9
Faced with this conflict of values, the court strained to satisfy
shareholder as separate from each other. What matters is each shareholder's
ownership interest in the separate legal person (i.e., the entity) that is co-owned.
Only from this perspective does it make sense to view transfer restrictions as
restraints on a person's right to sell his or her separate property. In contrast,
an aggregate view would approach each shareholder's ownership as reflecting
the shareholders relationship with the other shareholders.
165. Howe v. Roberts, 95 So. 344, 345 (Ala. 1923).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 345-46.
168. Id. at 345.
169. Id.
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both. It held that the plaintiff was indeed entitled to own all 235
shares "but will have the right to vote only twenty-five of them in
meetings of the stockholders." 17' This result resembles the approach
of partnership and LLC law, 17 ' but provided the plaintiff the worst of

both worlds. It is highly unlikely that he purchased the lion's share
of the corporation's stock for the purpose of being locked into an
enterprise he could not control. The court's opinion seeks to "stand
on two stools" and its remedy is accordingly a gerrymander.
The more recent case, F.B.I. Farms, Inc v. Moore, illustrates
that the entity-aggregate confusion can persist even when the
applicable, modem corporate statute expressly authorizes stock
transfer

restrictions. 172

The

case

concerns

a

family-owned

corporation, some of whose shares had ended up in the hands of the
ex-spouse of a family member. The corporation sought to enforce a
set of stock transfer restrictions that provided as follows:
1) No stock of said corporation shall be transferred,
assigned and/or exchanged or divided, unless or until
approved by the Directors thereof;
2) That if any stock be offered for sale, assigned and/or
transferred, the corporation should have the first
opportunity of purchasing the same at no more than the
book value thereof;
3) Should said corporation be not interested, and could not
economically offer to purchase said stock, any
stockholder of record should be given the next
opportunity to purchase said stock, at a price not to
exceed the book value thereof;
4) That if the corporation was not interested in the stock,
and any stockholders were not interested therein, then
the same could be sold to any blood member of the
family. Should they be desirous of purchasing the same,
then at not more than the book value thereof. '
The

first

and

fourth

restrictions

were

the

most hotly

170. Id. at 346.
171. Absent consent from the other owners, a transferee acquires no
management rights. A partnership or operating agreement can give that
consent categorically and in advance. In this instance, the corporation's charter
gave advance approval to any transfer that did not cause the transferee to own
more than twenty-five shares. The management (i.e., voting) rights of the
remaining shares were stripped away by the transfer. For a discussion of the
partnership and LLC approach, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
172. 798 N.E.2d 440.
173. Id. at 443.
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contested,'7 4 and had not fared well in the lower courts. However,
the Indiana Supreme Court was more hospitable. While noting that
"[alt common law, any restriction on the power to alienate personal
property was impermissible," the court held that "[miost of the
issues in this case are resolved by the Indiana statute governing
share transfer restrictions."175 Under that statute, "Indiana, like
allows corporations and their
virtually all jurisdictions,
shareholders to impose restrictions on transfers of shares. The basic
theory of these statutes is to permit owners of a corporation to
control its ownership and management and prevent outsiders from
inserting themselves into the operations of the corporation."'7 6
So far, the opinion reflects an aggregate approach, and, indeed,
the court proceeds to quote Justice Holmes for the proposition that,
in the context of a close corporation, the ownership of personal
property is more about the relationship among the property owners
than about restraints on alienation: "Stock in a corporation is not
merely property. It also creates a personal relation analogous
otherwise than technically to a partnership ....[TIhere seems to be
no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's
associates in a corporation than in a firm."1 77 Later, the opinion
reiterates in its own words the partnership analogy: "The policy
behind enforcement of these restrictions is to encourage entering
into formal partnerships by permitting all parties to have confidence
178
they will not involuntarily end up with an undesired co-venturer."
It thus appears that under Indiana law, stock transfer
"Transfer
restrictions are to be seen as ordinary contracts.
restrictions are treated as contracts either between shareholders or
Apart from any
between shareholders and the corporation.
statutory requirements [pertaining to the mechanics of adopting
restrictions], restrictions on transfer are to be read, like any other
contract, to further the manifest intention of the parties."" 9 In other
words-no strict construction.
The problem with this appearance is that the opinion contains
another holding: "Because [stock transfer restrictions] are
restrictions on alienation and therefore disfavored, the terms in the
restrictions are not to be expanded beyond their plain and ordinary

174. F.B.I. Farms, Inc. v. Moore, 769 N.E.2d 688, 693-94 (Ind.Ct. App. 2002)
(noting that Moore conceded the validity of the other two restrictions).
175. F.B.L Farms, Inc., 798 N.E.2d at 444-47 (holding that the corporation
had waived its right to insist on the second and third restrictions).
176. Id. at 445. Later in the opinion the court notes: "Closely held
corporations have a viable interest in remaining the organization they envision
at incorporation and transfer restrictions are an appropriate means of
maintaining the status quo." Id. at 446.
177. Id. at 445 (quoting Barrett v. King, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (Mass. 1902)).
178. Id. at 448.
179. Id. at 445-46 (footnote and citations omitted).
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meaning. 180 This holding contradicts the precept that "restrictions
on transfer are to be read .

.

. like any other contract," because

Indiana contract law recognizes the concept of latent ambiguity and
uses canons of construction and, where appropriate, extrinsic
evidence to determine meaning.' 8' The conflict forces the court to
contort its analysis of the two issues that are the crux of the case:
whether the transfer restrictions cover involuntary transfers and
whether the fourth restriction (limiting transfers to "blood
relatives") was unenforceable due to vagueness.
On the first of these issues, the court of appeals had been direct
and unequivocal:
F.B.I. Farms urges us to follow the lead of courts upholding
transfer restrictions [as applicable to involuntary transfers]
despite the failure to include language in the restrictions
regarding applicability to involuntary transfers. However,
we find the rule requiring strict construction of transfer
restrictions more persuasive and in line with Indiana
precedent. Generally, "[r]egulation of the alienation of
corporate stock is a restraint on the alienation of property
Such restraints are strictly
and is against public
182 policy."
construed by courts.

The Supreme Court was less coherent in its approach. At one
point, its opinion seems to assume that, although the ex-spouse had
obtained and apparently served a writ of execution to enforce his
judgment lien on the stock,183 the other spouse still had sufficient
ownership rights to offer the stock for sale. Indeed, the court even
implies that an involuntary transfer through a sheriffs sale
8 4 involves
some voluntary action by the judgment debtor/stockholder.
The opinion later explicitly recognizes that a sheriffs sale is an
involuntary transfer and addresses directly, but summarily, the
question of interpretation:
The language of the restrictions in this case does not
specifically refer to involuntary transfers of any kind.
Rather, it seems to contemplate restricting all transfers,
voluntary and involuntary, by providing that no stock of the
corporation should be "transferred, assigned, exchanged,
divided, or sold" without complying with the restrictions.
The intent of the parties is thus rather plain: to restrict
180. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
181. Hauck v. Second Nat'l Bank of Richmond, 286 N.E.2d 852, 862 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1972) (using a similar methodology to construe a trust instrument rather
than a contract).
182. F.B.L Farms, Inc., 769 N.E.2d 688, 692 (citations omitted).
183. F.B.I. Farms, Inc., 798 N.E.2d at 443 (referring to the writ of execution
and subsequent sheriffs sale).
184. Id. at 446 (stating that "before Linda could transfer her shares, she was
obliged to offer them to F.B.I. and the other shareholders").
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ownership to the designated group, and to preclude transfer
by any means.185
The court's reading of the provision is certainly a reasonable
one, but it is not the only reasonable one. The canon of construction
noscitur a sociis 181 suggests that the word at issue (transfer) should

be interpreted in light of the other words in the phrase. Each of
those words pertains to a voluntary transaction. At minimum, a
latent ambiguity exists, which under ordinary principles of Indiana
187
contract law, means that extrinsic evidence should be admitted.
The opinion ignores both these points, because the court cannot
acknowledge that the language is susceptible to alternate
interpretations. Alternate interpretations would put the court at
odds with its vestige of the entity view-i.e., with the "plain and
ordinary meaning" holding.
On the second issue-the enforceability of the "blood relative"
restriction-the court takes a "what the heck, it's clear enough for
present purposes" approach. Acknowledging that "one may quibble
with the terminology, and there may be some individuals where
status as blood members is debatable," the opinion states "we think
it plain enough that all parties to this dispute either are or are not
All are either direct
blood members of the Burger family.
descendants of Ivan or spouses of Ivan or of one of his children."88
But "plain enough" is not the same as "plain and ordinary." The
decision places the stock in the hands of an ex-spouse of one of
Ivan's children and subjects the stock to the blood transfer
restriction. Suppose the ex-spouse seeks to sell the stock to his exspouse's cousin (i.e., one who is not a lineal descendant of Ivan)?
The court's "plain enough" approach provides no guidance. The
opportunity for a delimiting interpretation is foreclosed by a vestige
of the entity approach-the notion of a restraint on alienation and
the requirement that contract interpretation be restricted to the
"plain and ordinary."
6. The Dichotomy and the Evolving Law: the LLC and its [?i
OperatingAgreement
As suggested by the reference above to the RULLCA drafting
185. Id. at 449.
186. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (8th ed. 2004) defines this Latin phrase
as "[al canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or
phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it."
187. Adams v. Reinaker, 808 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
Hauck, 286 N.E.2d at 862).
188. F.B.I. Farms, Inc., 798 N.E.2d at 448. The trial court had held the
restriction invalid as manifestly unreasonable, given the practical problems
caused by the vagueness of the term "blood relative." Id. The court of appeals
had affirmed but on a different ground: "[Tiransfer restrictions are strictly
construed. Thus, if the transfer restriction is ambiguous, it is unenforceable."
F.B.I. Farms, 769 N.E.2d at 695.
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project, the entity-aggregate dichotomy also has an impact on
evolving statutory law. One major manifestation concerns the way
in which LLC statutes express the relationship between the
operating agreement and the LLC. That relationship has a foot on
two stools: LLC statutes characterize the operating agreement as an
agreement among the members,'
and there is no doubt that both
statute drafters and practitioners view the operating agreement as
the most important instrument for governing an LLC's internal
affairs. 9° That situation bespeaks an aggregate view.
In contrast, the LLC comes into existence as an entity separate
from its members'91 and, at least ab initio, is a stranger to the
operating agreement. Yet there is little practical doubt that the
member's operating agreement should govern and be enforceable by
the LLC.192 What is doubtful, or at least variable, is how that
189. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601(12)(a) (1998) ("'Operating
agreement' means . . . [any written or oral agreements among all members
concerning the affairs of a limited liability company or the conduct of its
business."); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-102(11)(a) (2004) ("'Operating
agreement' means any agreement of all of the members as to the affairs of a
limited liability company and the conduct of its business."); FLA. STAT.

ANN. §

608.423(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) ("[A]ll members of a limited liability
company may enter into an operating agreement ...

to regulate the affairs of

the limited liability company.., and to govern relations among the members ..
.."). LLC aficionados also understand how it is possible for a single member
LLC to have an agreement of its members. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, §
18-101(6) (1999) ("Limited liability company' and 'domestic limited liability
company' means a limited liability company formed under the laws of the State
of Delaware and having 1 or more members."); REVISED UNIF. LTD.LIAB. Co. ACT

§ 110(d) (2005 Annual Meeting Draft) ("A sole member may make the operating
agreement in any manner the member desires, including by signing a record
stating the terms of the agreement and that the agreement is the limited
liability's operating agreement."); see generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 26, 5.06[3] [d].
190. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 203(c) (1996) (providing that inter
se the members the operating agreement governs in the event of a conflict
between the operating agreement and the articles of organization); BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26,
5.05[3] (questioning "why a limited liability
company (or its organizers) would want to include any optional material in the
articles of organization" because "reasons of confidentiality and convenience
argue for placing a minimum of information in the publicly filed articles").
191. See supranotes 44-51 and accompanying text.
192. But cf Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL
285938, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1997). That case was brought by a member
on behalf of the LLC, and the defendants sought to compel arbitration pursuant
to an arbitration provision in the operating agreement. The court denied
arbitration, because the arbitration provision applied only to "parties" and the
LLC "was not a party." Id. at *6. The defendants had argued that "the
arbitration clause [was] binding because ... the agreements govern [the LLC's]
operation." Id. at *5. The court rejected that argument: "To be sure, [the LLC]
is a beneficiary of and subordinate to some of the terms of the Agreement,
however, it is not an express party to them or the arbitration clauses contained
therein." Id. The LLC's standing to enforce the operating agreement is subject
to another qualification, not directly relevant here-namely, whether the LLC
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practical fact is expressed.
It might seem that the simplest approach would be to make the
LLC a party to the agreement, or at least specifically empower the
LLC to be so. So far,193however, LLC statutes have generally not
taken either approach.

Consider, for example, the current uniform LLC act, the
Delaware act, and a recent draft of the "next generation" uniform
act. ULLCA, the current uniform act, defines "operating agreement"
to mean "the agreement under section 103 concerning the relations
194
among the members, managers, and limited liability company,"
and section 103 provides that "all members of a limited liability
company may enter into an operating agreement."195 Section 112
provides that "a limited liability company has the same powers as
an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry on its
business or affairs, including power to... make contracts," 196 but the
section does not specifically empower the LLC to be a party to an
agreement described as being of "all members."
The Delaware statute specifically answers the question of
whether the LLC is bound by the operating agreement but
addresses only obliquely the question of whether the LLC may
enforce the agreement. The statute's definition of "limited liability
company agreement" (Delaware-speak for "operating agreement")
provides that: "A limited liability company is not required to execute
its limited liability company agreement. A limited liability company
is bound by its limited liability company agreement whether or not
the limited liability company executes the limited liability company
agreement." 97 Certainly this language implies that a limited
liability company may execute and thereafter be able to enforce the
has itself been directly injured. This question is the "reverse" direct-derivative
question. For a discussion of this issue, see supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
193. A few have, typically when considering how a single member LLC
might have an operating agreement. For example, Illinois, which has adopted
ULLCA, includes the following, non-uniform provision:
In a limited liability company with only one member, the
operating agreement includes any of the following:
(1) Any writing, without regard to whether the writing
otherwise constitutes an agreement, as to the company's
affairs signed by the sole member.
(2) Any written agreement between the member and the
company as to the company's affairs.
805 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(c)(1)-(2) (West 2004). The North Carolina
statute provides more generally that "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided
in a written operating agreement, a limited liability company shall be deemed
for all purposes to be a party to the operating agreement of its member or
members." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-05 (2000).
194. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT

§

101(13) (1996).

195. Id. § 103(a).
196. Id. § 112(b)(5).
197. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (1999).
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limited liability company agreement, but why not say so directly? '
As for RULLCA, the February 2005 draft states specifically that
the LLC is governed by and may enforce the operating agreement,
but the draft eschews the direct approach of making the LLC a party
to that agreement. Section 110(c) provided: "Whether or not a
limited liability company has itself manifested assent to the
operating agreement, the limited liability company is bound by and
may enforce the operating agreement."1 99
What is going on here? What is the difference between on one
hand being both obligated under and able to enforce an agreement,
and on the other, being a party to it? Is RULLCA trying obliquely to
make the LLC a mere third-party beneficiary? Does the Delaware
legislature believe that giving the LLC standing to enforce the LLC
agreement is such a debatable matter that it should be done only by
the agreement of the members?
I suspect that the situation reflects entity-aggregate confusion
or at least uncertainty. In the context of a close corporation, it is
commonplace to have shareholder agreements and for the
corporation to be a party. But in that context it has long been clear
that the shareholder agreement is not foundational, however
Conceptually, at least, the shareholder
important it may be.
agreement is secondary to the articles of incorporation, and the
corporation comes into existence through the filing of its articles and
not through the execution of the shareholder agreement. Thus the
corporation exists as a distinct entity before it has any shareholders,
and it therefore is quite easy to imagine the corporation being
parties to an agreement with its shareholders. °°
The paradigm for limited liability companies is subtly different.
Although as a matter of form, an LLC cannot exist de jure without
having filed articles of organization, as a matter of both concept and
201
practice, the operating agreement is the foundational document.
Indeed, given the expansive language most LLC statutes use to
describe the operating agreement,2 2 the formation of an LLC

198. Another part of the same definition, added in 2004, empowers the
limited liability company agreement to give rights (and presumably standing) to
third parties, a set that presumably includes the LLC itself. 74 Del. Laws 275 §
1 (2004) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7)) ("A limited
liability company agreement may provide rights to any person, including a
person who is not a party to the limited liability company agreement, to the
extent set forth therein.").
199. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 110(c) (Feb. 2005 Meeting draft).
200. This observation is derived from comments made to the author by
Attorney Louis G. Hering, a partner with the Wilmington, Delaware firm of
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell.
201. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 203(c)(1) (1996) (stating that, in
case of a conflict between the operating agreement and the articles of
organization, inter se the members, the operating agreement controls); supra
note 190 and accompanying text.
202. Most LLC statutes define the scope of an operating agreement quite
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concomitantly and inevitably brings an operating agreement into
203
There can be no LLC other than as a result and
existence.
reflection of the agreement of its member or members.
To some, making the LLC a party to an agreement of its
members seems at best like a snake swallowing its tail, and at worst
like conceptual miscegenation.
Moreover, many expert LLC
practitioners are steeped in the practice, philosophy and law of
partnerships. They view the LLC entity mostly as a necessary evil
for maintaining the liability shield, and they have years of
experience drafting partnership agreements to which the
partnership is almost never a party. To these experts, allowing the
entity into the aggregate-i.e., making the organization a co-party
with the real parties-smells of the "corpufuscation" of the law of
unincorporated business organizations. 2 4 They fear the hidden and
unintended consequences that may result.
7. The Dichotomy and "Shelf' LLCs
The "corpufuscation" concern also influences the ongoing debate
over whether LLC statutes should permit "shelf LLCs"-i.e., LLCs
duly formed through the filing of articles of organization but having
no members upon formation. 20 5 There is some practical utility for
this possibility; it is often convenient to have the "vehicle" waiting
for a deal to finalize.
broadly, often referring to any agreement "concerning the limited liability
company." See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 5.06[1] [a].
203. The Reporters' Notes to the May 2005 draft of RULLCA provide the
following explanation:
For example, suppose (i) two persons orally and informally agree to
join their activities in some way through the mechanism of an LLC,
(ii) they form the LLC or cause it to be formed, and (iii) without
further ado or agreement, they become the LLC's initial members.
The LLC has an operating agreement, because "all the members" have
agreed on who the members are" and that agreement-no matter how
informal or rudimentary-is an agreement "concerning the limited
liability company."
The same result follows when a person becomes the sole initial
member of an LLC. It is not plausible that the person would lack any
understanding or intention with regard to the LLC.
That
understanding or intention constitutes an "agreement of all the
members, including a single member, concerning the limited liability
company."
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 102(13), Reporters' Notes (May 2005
Teleconference draft).
204. On information and belief, responsibility (or credit) for this neologism is
mine. It is derived from a characterization made by Robert Keatinge, ABA
Advisor to RULLCA (email on file with author).
205. The name "shelf LLC" is derived from securities law usage-the shelf
registration. See Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In
a 'shelf registration,' the registrant can register a large number of securities
and offer the securities to the public 'on a continuous or delayed basis.'")
(quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2004)).
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In corporate law, such an arrangement is a no-brainer. For
example, the Model Business Corporation Act contemplates postincorporation organizational activities being conducted by the board
of directors, if named in the articles of incorporation, or, if not, by
the incorporators, without regard to whether the corporation has
any shareholders." 6
As a practical matter, it is the rare corporation that is formed
without having a shareholder or shareholders "waiting in the
wings," especially when the corporation is destined to be closely
held.
It is possible, indeed commonplace, to have a valid
"subscription for shares entered into before incorporation."2 °7
Therefore, the creation of a closely held corporate entity typically
reflects or at least follows from an understanding among the
owners-to-be. The "shelf' corporation is thus atypical, but corporate
law nonetheless contemplates and permits the arrangement.
In contrast, few LLC statutes provide for shelf LLCs, °8 and
some expressly prohibit them. For example, Utah's LLC Act states
that "itlhe signing of the articles of organization constitutes an
affirmation by the organizers that the company has one or more
members".0 9 California's statute states that the "one or more
persons" who "execute and file articles of organization ...

need not, be members"

210

may, but

but21that "[a] limited liability company shall

have one or more members."

1

Delaware's position is at best equivocal. The Delaware Act
defines a domestic limited liability company as "a limited liability
206. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.05(a) (2002). The Official Comment
describes the post-incorporation organizational tasks as including "the raising
of equity capital by the issuance of shares to the participants in the venture."
Id. § 2.05(a), Official Comment.
207. Id. § 6.20(a).
208. The Minnesota act does so. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.60 Subd. 2 (West
2004) (stating that after the filing of the articles of organization, "the [LLC's]
organizers or governors . . .shall either hold an organizational meeting ... or
take written action, for the purposes of transacting business and taking actions
necessary or appropriate to complete the organization of the limited liability
company," without requiring that members be involved). However, Minnesota
has always taken a corporate approach to the governance of LLCs. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 322.01, Reporters' Notes, Preface (West 2004) ("The Joint
Committee [convened to develop a proposal for limited liability company
legislation] determined that a more appropriate legislative model would be a
partnership model modified to adopt corporate default management and
governance rules .... The corporate governance adoption was the Joint
Committee's most significant decision and drives the content and character of
the new act.")
209. 2005 Utah Laws 141 (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c401(2)(a)(i)).
210. CAL. CORP.CODE ANN.§ 17050(a) (Deering 1997 & Supp. 2005).
211. Id. § 17050(b). See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-632(A)(6)(b) (West
1998 & Supp. 2004) (requiring a member-managed LLC's articles of
organization to state the name and address of 'each person who is a member of
the [LLC].").
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company formed under the laws of the State of Delaware and having
1 or more members" 212 and provides that "[i]n order to form a limited
liability company, [one] or more authorized persons must execute a
certificate of formation.""3 The Act nowhere defines "authorized
person," but presumably the authorization comes from the person or
persons who will become the LLC's initial "[one] or more
members." 14
The RULLCA drafting committee has flirted with a limited
duration shelf LLC. In the February 2005 draft, section 401
(Becoming a Member) provided:
(a) A person becomes an initial member in connection with
the formation of a limited liability company, upon the
later of:
(1) the formation of the limited liability company; or
(2) the time provided in and upon compliance with:
(A) the understanding of the person that is to
become the sole initial member; or

212. DEL. CODEANN., tit. 6, § 18-101(6) (1999).
213. Id. § 18-201(a).
214.

It is possible to argue that § 18-301 permits a shelf LLC. Section 18-

301(a) describes how a person becomes an initial member, and § 18-301(a)(2)
seems to contemplate that event happening sometime after the formation of the
LLC-i.e., as provided in the limited liability company agreement (as contrasted
with § 18-301(a)(1)-upon formation). However, as explained in the Reporters'
Notes to the February 2005 draft of RULLCA, "section 18-301(a)(2) depends on
the notion that an LLC agreement can exist before the LLC is formed, even
though DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) defines an LLC agreement as being 'of
the member or members' and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(11) defines
'member' as 'a person who has been admitted to a [presumably existing] limited
liability company.'" REVISED UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 401, Reporters' Notes
(Feb. 2005 Meeting draft). The Reporters' Notes characterize § 18-301(a)(2) as
reflecting a "Klein bottle approach," and explain:
A 'Klein bottle' is a mathematical construct-a bottle with neither
inside nor outside, because the neck of the bottle is elongated and
passes into the center of the bottle through the side of the bottle
without the presence of a hole in the side. A Klein bottle can,
therefore, be realized only in four dimensions.
Id. On the other hand, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §18-201(b) (1999) provides that an
LLC is formed at the time of the filing of the initial certificate of formation in
the office of the Secretary of State or at any later date or time specified in the
certificate of formation if, in either case, there has been substantial compliance
with the requirements of this section and "this section" does not require that the

limited liability company have any members upon formation. However, it is
difficult to reconcile this argument with the Delaware Act's definition of a
Delaware LLC as having "[one] or more members."
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(B) an agreement among the persons
that are to
215
become the initial members.

The Reporters' Notes connected this provision to section
701(a)(3), 216 which provided for dissolution upon "the passage of 90
consecutive days during which the [LLCI has no members." 17 That
provision was subject to change by the operating agreement, but
without an initial member there can be no operating agreement.
Thus, the February 2005 draft of RULLCA obliquely provided for a
shelf LLC while limiting the shelf life to eighty-nine days.
The shelf concept had previously roiled the waters of the
Drafting Committee,2 18 but at its February 2005 meeting the
Committee rejected the concept by almost a consensus. 2 9

The

predominant sentiment seemed to be that since an LLC is like a
partnership in this respect and a partnership cannot exist without
partners, an LLC should not be able exist without members.
8. The Dichotomy in OtherAspects of ULLCA If
The February 2005 meeting of the RULLCA Drafting
Committee provided two other examples of the influence of the
The first concerned the right of
entity/aggregate construct.
members in a member-managed LLC to have access to records
maintained by their enterprise. As presented to the committee, the
February 2005 draft provided that:
[i]n a member-managed limited liability company .

.

. [a]

member may, without having any particularpurpose for
seeking the information, inspect and copy during regular
business hours, at a reasonable location specified by the
limited liability company, any records maintained by the
limited liability company regarding the limited liability
company's activities and financial condition.22 °
At the behest of the Committee's ABA Advisor, the Committee
215. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 401(a) (Feb. 2005 Meeting draft).
216. Id. § 401, Reporters' Notes.
217. Id. § 701(a)(3).
218. Id. § 401, Reporters' Notes (stating that "[alt the November, 2003
meeting, discussion was intense and views divided as to whether this Act
should allow 'shelf LLCs").
219. Id. § 401(a) Reporters' Notes (May 2005 Teleconference draft). This
decision will doubtlessly be re-visited. The Committee's advisors include some
strong advocates for the shelf LLC, including an advisor from the ABA's
Corporate Law Committee. I owe thanks to my colleague, Professor Russ
Pannier, for pointing out to me that a shelf LLC is reminiscent of the
mathematical concept of a "null" set-i.e., a set with no members. See HERBERT
B. ENDERTON, ELEMENTS OF SET THEORY 2 (Academic Press 1977); BARBARA H.
PARTEE, ET AL., MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN LINGUISTICS

Publishers 1993).
220. REVISED UNIF.
(emphasis added).

LTD. LIAB.

Co.

ACT

4 (Kluwer Academic

§ 411(a)(1) (Feb. 2005 Meeting draft)
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changed the language to provide this information right only "to the
extent that the information is material to the member's rights and
The ABA
duties under the operating agreement or this [act] .221
Advisor advocated for the change by asserting that the information
at issue belongs to the LLC as a separate entity and not to the
members severally (i.e., not as members of an aggregate).
The other example concerned the remedies available to a
member who sues under the Act or the operating agreement. Like
its predecessors, the February 2005 draft followed RUPA, ULLCA,
and ULPA,222 stating that a member could bring a claim "with or
without an accounting."2 23 "At its February, 2005 meeting, the
Drafting Committee deleted [that phrase] on the theory that the
partnership remedy of accounting reflected the aggregate nature of
a partnership and is inappropriate for an entity such as an LLC.
225

It would be
dichotomy,

226

VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
possible to detail further examples

but instead this section

of the

presents some tentative

221. Id. § 410(a)(1) (May 2005 teleconference draft).
222. See UNIF. LTD. P'sHIP ACT § 1001(a) (2001); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
405(b) (1997); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 410(a) (1996).
223. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co.ACT § 901(a) (Feb. 2005 Meeting draft).
224. Id. § 901 Reporters' Notes (May 2005 Teleconference draft). The
accounting remedy is different than the equitable claim for an accounting that
arises from a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. In the latter sense,
"accounting" is synonymous with a claim for disgorgement or for the imposition
of a constructive trust. See id.
225. This caption is borrowed from the title of a book written by a keen, if
somewhat disdainful, observer of business organizations. See V.I. LENIN, WHAT
ISTO BE DONE (International Publishers Co. 1929).
226. For example, when an LLC member becomes bankrupt, the trustee's
power to use and dispose of the membership rights depends in part on whether
the bankruptcy court views those rights as mere property (an entity approach)
or as analogous to a personal service contract (an aggregate approach). See,
e.g., In re Ehmann, 319 B.R. 200, 203-06 (Bankr. Ariz. 2005). The entityaggregate question is also implicated when a shareholder in a closely held
corporation claims that the corporation's lawyer is also his or her lawyer.
In support of his position that he has an attorney-client relationship
with defendant, plaintiff cites a number of cases standing for the
proposition that the corporate veil will be pierced where the corporate
identity is being used to further fraud or injustice. These cases are
not factually similar to the instant matter as they involve claims
against a corporate principal attempting to protect himself from
personal liability through the corporate entity. At the same time,
these cases are instructive as they point out the difficulties in treating
a closely held corporation with few shareholdersas an entity distinct
from the shareholders. Instances in which the corporation attorneys
stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are
obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is
small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the
corporate entity. Instead, the corporate attorneys, because of their
close interaction with a shareholder or shareholders, simply stand in
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thoughts for rationalizing the law. The first thought is one of
moderation. We cannot and should not avoid the dichotomy. These
constructs comprise a useful shorthand for understanding
perspectives on closely held business organizations. Moreover, they
are so deeply rooted in our law that to pull one or the other up "root
and branch" would likely bring undesirable unintended
consequences.
We should, however, be more aware and intentional in our use of
this shorthand. We should root out the tendency to have results
determined by either construct and must remember that the
constructs are merely means to describe and analyze relationships.
They are more a duality than a dichotomy. In this sense, we should
emulate Humpty Dumpty and treat the constructs as servants of the
analysis rather than as the masters.227
The problem is to know which construct to use at which times.
Two disparate sources of wisdom suggest that context might be the
key. In the words of H.L.A. Hart:
If we look now at the type of theory so attractive to common
sense which asserts that statements referring to
corporations are "abbreviations" and so can be reduced or
translated into statements referring only to individuals, we
can see now in precisely what way they failed. Their
confidential relationships in respect to both the corporation and
individual shareholders.
Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, PC, 309 N.W.2d 645,
648-49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Even the
"pass through" system of partnership taxation partakes of both sides of the
dichotomy. As the United State Supreme Court explained more than thirty
years ago:
There has been a great deal of discussion in the briefs and in the
lower court opinions with respect to whether a partnership is to be
viewed as an "entity" or as a "conduit." We find ourselves in
agreement with the Solicitor General's remark during oral argument
when he suggested that "[iut seems odd that we should still be
discussing such things in 1972." The legislative history indicates, and
the commentators agree, that partnerships are entities for purposes of
calculating and filing informational returns but that they are conduits
through which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual
partners in accord with their distributive shares.
United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 448 n.8 (1973) (citation omitted). Note
that this characterization parallels the non-tax characterization of a
partnership as stated in a legal encyclopedia in use almost 100 years ago. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
227. Humpty Dumpty took this position to the extreme, however:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be masterthat's all."
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 94 (Random House 1965) (1865).
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mistake was that of... [not] specifying the conditions under
which such statements are true and the manner in which
they are used.22
The other source is a story from the Jewish tradition, of an
individual conceptualized both as Pan (citizen) Levy and Shochet
(kosher butcher) Levy:
[A] Jewish communal official was summoned to court as a
witness in a case. "Shochet Levy!" called out the Polish
judge. "I beg your pardon, Your Honor-my name is not
Shochet Levy," the witness demurred. "I am Levy, the
communal official."
But the judge was obstinate.
"In my records," he persisted, "I read that, among other
things, you are also a slaughterer. I, therefore, am justified
in calling you 'Shochet Levy."'
"Your Honor," replied the witness with dignity, "when I
stand before the court I'm Pan Levy. When I stand before
Levy
my congregation and conduct the service I'm Cantor
229
and, when I stand before an ox, I'm Shochet Levy."
But which aspects of context matter for choosing a side of the
entity-aggregate duality? The answer is found by linking to another
fundamental aspect of business organization law-the distinction
between issues inter se the organization and issues involving third
party claims. Inter se issues involve only the owners of the
enterprise and those claiming through them. 2 0 For these issues, the
law should presumptively use the aggregate view, which more
closely resembles the real-world views of the participants. 2 1' The
presumption should give way where any of the following apply:
228. HART, supra note 43, at 40 (critiquing attempts to conceptualize
corporations as mere aggregates).
229. Proper Distinctions, in A TREASURY OF JEWISH FOLKLORE: STORIES,
TRADITIONS, LEGENDS, HUMOR, WISDOM AND FOLK SONGS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

(Nathan Ausubel ed., 26th prtg. 1968) at 437.
230. The most recent draft of RULLCA expresses this notion in some detail
in its description of the power of an operating agreement:
[T]he operating agreement governs: (1) relations among the members
as members and between the members and the limited liability
company; (2) the rights and duties under this [act] of a person in the
capacity of manager: and (3) the rights under this [act] of a person in
the capacity of a dissociated member or transferee.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 110(a) (2005 Annual Meeting Draft).
231. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 1 10.09. As the number of
owners increases, this sense of aggregate may disappear, but by that time the
enterprise is not the typical "closely held" business.
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-

The entity construct reflects, preserves or implements
an aspect of the aggregate arrangement;

-

The owners have otherwise agreed (because it is
"aggregate-like" to permit the owners to opt into an
entity construct); or

-

The entity approach is warranted by clearly expressed,
overriding policy concerns from other law.

879

For matters involving third party rights, the entity view should
apply because the "shield" is more than an aggregate's
desideratum; 212 it is by far the most important characteristic of the
233
The shield makes
enterprise as experienced by third parties.
sense, both conceptually and in terms of fairness, only if the
organization is conceptualized consistently vis-a-vis outsiders. VisA-vis outsiders, the shield treats the organization as an entity; the
same treatment should apply to other issues involving third party
rights.234
Unlike the approach suggested for inter se issues, this approach
should not be subject to variance by the agreement of the entity's
232. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (suggesting that, to some
practitioners, the concept of an LLC as an entity is a mere necessary evil to
obtain the benefits of a liability shield).
233. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 108 cmt. (a) (2001) (stating that "[iun 1916, most
business organizations were either unshielded (e.g., general partnerships) or

partially shielded (e.g., limited partnerships), and it was reasonable for third
parties to believe that an individual whose own name appeared in the name of a
business would 'stand behind' the business. Today most businesses have a full
shield (e.g., corporations, limited liability companies, most limited liability
partnerships)" which protects even owners whose names appear as part of the
entity's name); HART, supra note 43, at 37-38 (discussing Maitland's
hypothetical of Nusquamia to illustrate how holding an entity liable for its
debts cannot be explained in terms of residual obligations of the entity's
constituents). But ef Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 394-95 (arguing
that the more important function of entity status is to protect the assets of the
enterprise from the claims of creditors of the owners). Even under their view,
however, the point in the text remains valid, albeit transposed.
234. In this context, third party rights include the rights of the public,
expressed through regulatory law. This position runs counter to Professor
Ribstein's argument that (i) "as many scholars now believe, a corporation is a
nexus of contracts," (ii) "these contract rights should be constitutionally
protected to the same extent as other contract rights," and (iii) therefore, "the
state must show why intervention in the corporate contract is constitutionally
justified given the availability of self-protection through private contracting."
Larry E. Ribstein, CorporatePolitical Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 109
(1992). Leaving aside the nettlesome question of how private contracting could
shield owners from tort liability, the point is that the owners have chosen to
take advantage of the most salient aspect of entity status (the shield) and
should not be heard to complain if the law treats their collective enterprise as
an entity rather than as an aggregate (a nexus of contracts).
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owners. For example, the owners should not have the power to
devolve their entity into an aggregate and agree that their
organization lacks the capacity to be sued in its own name.235
Eliminating the capacity to be sued as an entity would make it far
more difficult for a creditor of the entity to effect service of process
and would raise questions about the liability of the entity if the
creditor were unable to obtain jurisdiction over all of the owners.
To take a somewhat more elaborate example, the owners of a
closely held, shielded business should not have the power to override
by agreement the distinction between direct and derivative claims.
Such an override amounts to choosing to be an aggregate (for these
purposes) rather than an entity, and that choice might endanger
third party interests.2 36
This problem does not exist with the ALI's judicial override
approach,237 which has its own problems, but does take into account
third party interests. The relevant third parties are, of course,
creditors of the entity. "[T]he derivative proceeding ...

protects [the

entity's] creditors by putting the proceeds of the recovery back in the
[entity] .238

Permitting the owners of the entity to eliminate the derivative
requirement vitiates that protection. For example, in the context of
a limited liability company:
If an operating agreement permits members to bring direct
claims to redress injuries suffered by the LLC, that
permission will render the derivative approach moot and
thereby destroy a potentially important safeguard for the
LLC's creditors. Functionally and financially, when the
entity has suffered the harm, permitting a direct claim
effects a distribution of entity assets to the entity's owners.
If the entity is insolvent, or nearly so, this constructive
distribution is improper, resembles a fraudulent transfer,
and will likely be subject to a turnover order in any
bankruptcy proceeding pertaining to the LLC. 9
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to exhume and re-examine an issue
apparently laid to rest by the enactment of RUPA and the advent of
235. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P'sHIP ACT § 1l0(b)(1) (2001) (stating that a
"partnership agreement may not... vary a limited partnership's power under
Section 105 to sue, be sued, and defend in its own name").
236. It follows from this point that RUPA's approach (eliminating the
distinction) became inappropriate once RUPA was revised to provide for LLPs.
237. That approach, stated in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 80, §
7.01(d), is discussed supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
238. Durham, 871 A.2d at 45 (quoting Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 51
(Ga. 1983)).
[ii] (Supp. 05-1).
239. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, 10.01[2] [b]
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limited liability companies. As the discussion has shown, we may all
be entities now, but not for all purposes.
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